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Abstract
This study examines pensions portability and the preservation of pensions rights
in the U.K. We review the economic theory underlying pension schemes and the
arguments for and against more pensions portability. We show that the effect of
current laws and actuarial practice is to penalize young early leavers heavily, so
that they can lose up to 30% of the pension that they might have expected when
they retire. We propose a policy to reduce this early leaver penalty according to a
sliding scale that involves determining transfer values for younger workers on the
basis of actual contributions paid rather than on notional accrued benefits, but with
accrued benefits having a more significant weight in calculating the transfer values
of older early leavers. The effects of the various actuarial valuation methods and
assumptions used as well as the discretion allowed to actuaries are discussed in
detail. We also compare the position of early leavers in the U.S., Canada, the
Netherlands, and Japan.
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Executive Summary
For at least two decades, the issue of the pension rights of early leavers has been a
matter of public policy concern in industrialized countries whose pension systems
rely heavily on funded defined benefit private sector pension schemes. In the
U.K., the average worker changes jobs at least five times in his or her career and
only a small proportion of workers will hold the same job at retirement as when
they began pensionable service. Yet about 60% of full-time male workers and
53% of full-time female workers are in an occupational pension schemes, most of
which are of the defined benefit type in which pensions rights are either not fully
portable or not fully preserved.We show in this study that these people can lose a
substantial fraction of their pension rights because they switch between jobs with
different pension plans.This capital loss leads to labour market imperfections
which help to reduce job mobility.
In this study, we examine the ways in which early leavers from pension schemes
are penalized because:
 Pension rights are based on the final salary in each job, with limited reval-
uation for inflation. This will lead to lower benefits if there is real earnings
growth over the life cycle.
 Defined benefit plans involve implicitly backloaded contributions so that
workers who move to defined contribution schemes in mid-career will lose
pension benefits because they will not receive the benefits of the backloaded
employer contributions in their late career.
 If employees leave a scheme during the vesting period (currently two years),
they will lose their pension rights.
 There are penalties and variations associated with the calculation of transfer
values to other pension schemes (including defined contribution schemes),
or welfare costs of remaining in a defined benefit scheme when individual
circumstances have changed.
In Chapter 2, we review the economics of pensions and portability. Our main
conclusions are:
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 Private pensions provide tax incentives to encourage savings.
 In the absence of more direct and precise instruments for dealing with un-
recovered training costs, monitoring employee performance and inducing
retirement in a world where the firm does not have complete knowledge
concerning the type or ability of the workers it employs, the economics lit-
erature argues that the pension scheme will be used (however bluntly) to
deal with these matters.
In Chapter 3, we review the U.K. legislation on portability and explain how
the rules affect the computation of transfer values and deferred pensions. Our
conclusion is that the outcome of U.K. legislation over the past two decades has
been a dramatic improvement in the position of early leavers. Portability losses
are still large, however. In addition, the transfer values that workers receive are
subject to a large degree of actuarial discretion that can dramatically affect their
size. Recent legislation (in particular the Pensions Act of 1995) has actually had
the perverse effect of reducing transfer values for early leavers.
Chapter 4 quantifies the portability losses faced by workers who change jobs.
Our analysis focuses on two types of portability loss:
 Cash equivalent lossesarise because the early leaver’s leaving salary is
revalued to retirement age at a less favourable rate than used to determine
the projected final salary. In computing transfer values, actuaries use the
‘current unit method with revaluation’ to revalue salaries, while they use
the ‘projected unit method’ to project final salaries. These different meth-
ods lead to fewer ‘added years’ being credited in a new scheme than are
earned in the leaving scheme. We show that, other things being equal about
the entering and leaving scheme, about the jobs and about actuarial projec-
tions, the only factors determining the cash equivalent loss are the ages at
separation and the estimated real growth rate of wages. The cash equivalent
loss is largest inabsoluteterms for workers who leave schemes in middle
age, but isrelativelythe highest for the youngest early leavers.
 Backloading lossesdue to the implicit backloading of contributions in a
defined benefit scheme causes additional losses to those who switch to
schemes which do not backload contributions. This type of loss is an es-
pecially significant consideration with the increasing importance of money
purchase schemes.
From 6 April 1997, the 1995 Pensions Act imposes a Minimum Funding Re-
quirement (MFR) for defined benefit pension schemes contracting out of SERPS.
The individual’s equivalent of the aggregate Minimum Funding Requirement
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(MFR) is the Minimum Cash Equivalent. For the Minimum Cash Equivalent com-
ponent of transfers, actuaries are required to base their assumptions concerning
real wage growth, inflation rates and yields on securities on the MFR norms as
specified in Guidance Note 27 of the Faculty and Institute of Actuaries, although
they have some discretion to deviate from these norms. For any deferred bene-
fit in excess of the Minimum Cash Equivalent, actuaries have considerably more
discretion.
We show that, even if the MFR norms are realized and the actuaries make
all transfer value calculations based on these norms, early leavers experience at
least thecash equivalent loss. In addition, they also experience thebackloading
loss if their new scheme is a defined contribution scheme with age-independent
contributions. With the MFR norms realized, early leavers will be indifferent as to
whether to leave a deferred pension or to take the cash equivalent of their deferred
pension as a transfer value to their next scheme.
Leaving a deferred pension is a better option if the actuariesov restimatethe
degree of future real wage growth and a transfer value is a better option if ac-
tuariesunderestimatethe degree of future real wage growth. The MFR norms
stipulate a constant growth rate in wages of2% per annum which is close to the
historical average in the U.K.. However, it is a stylized fact of modern labour
markets that most workers experience higher real wage growth early in their ca-
reers than nearer retirement. The implication of this is that the MFR norms will in
general overestimate future wage growth for early leavers and as a consequence
bias down the number of ‘added years’ that a given cash equivalent buys in a new
scheme. This means that it is preferable on average for early leavers to choose
to leave deferred pensions rather than to take transfer values to their new scheme.
The downside to the financial advantage of the deferred pension option is the ad-
ministrative inconvenience of having to draw a number of deferred pensions in
retirement.
In Chapter 5, we apply a number of realistic job separation histories to the
lifetime earnings profiles of a range of ‘average’ and ‘typical’ U.K. workers. We
show that cash equivalent losses can be quite substantial: between10% and20%
of the full service pension for those choosing deferred pensions and up to30%
for those taking transfer values. Losses are significantly larger for those switching
into schemes that do not benefit from the implicit backloading of contributions in
defined benefit schemes.
In Chapter 6, we review the discretion available to actuaries in making their
calculations of cash equivalents. We compute elasticities of actuarial discretion
which measure the ratio of the percentage change in the computed pension benefit
to the percentage change in the actuarial assumption. We evaluate these elasticities
at the MFR norms and find that small changes in actuarial assumptions can have
relatively large effects on the value of the pension in payment. We examine the
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following actuarial discretionary parameters in detail: discount rates, inflation
uprating factors, annuity factors, and wage growth rates. With the exception of the
annuity factor, the impact of changes in different assumptions depends on the time
to retirement. We also identify a number of other areas (such as the valuation of
discretionary benefits) over which the actuary also has discretion and on which it
is not possible for us to comment in the absence of published documentation as to
standard practice. We accept that individual circumstances can vary tremendously
and recognize that either actuarial discretion or more complex rules (beyond the
MFR assumptions) might be needed.
Chapter 7 examines pensions portability in other countries. We find that the
Netherlands offers the highest degree of pensions portability and the U.S., at
present, the least. The UK, along with Canada and Japan, comes somewhere
in between.
In Chapter 8, we present a policy proposal which would not require major
changes in legislation but would still improve dramatically the treatment of early
leavers. It involves workers receiving some of their accrued contributions back
when they leave a scheme in addition to a fraction of their accrued service credits
calculated according to current methods. However, this proposal does not elimi-
nate the portability losses of early leavers, it only reduces them. Within the context
of defined benefit schemes, full portability requires either the complete transfer-
ability of service credits or the complete indexing of deferred pensions to real
wage growth. In the absence of these changes to current practice, full portabil-
ity in the context of private sector schemes can only be achieved using defined
contribution schemes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
For at least two decades, the issue of the pension rights of early leavers has been
a matter of public policy concern in industrialized countries such as the U.K.
whose pension systems rely heavily on funded defined benefit private sector pen-
sion schemes.1 In the U.K., the average worker changes jobs at least five times
in his or her career (Booth, Francesconi, and Garcia-Serrano 1996). Only a small
proportion of workers will hold the same job at retirement as when they began
pensionable service:4:6% of men and1:1% of women have more than 30 years’
tenure in a single company in the U.K. (Burgess and Rees 1994). Yet, about
60% of full-time male workers and 53% of full-time female workers are in oc-
cupational pension schemes ((Office of Population Censuses and Surveys 1996),
p. 211), most of which are of the defined benefit type in which pension rights
are either not fully portable or not fully preserved. We show that these people
can lose a substantial fraction of their pension rights because they switch between
jobs with different pension plans. This capital loss leads to strong labour market
imperfections which tend to reduce job mobility.
The penalties for changing jobs that are built into most occupational pension
schemes have broader implications. Workers who know that they face large porta-
bility losses may opt for personal pension plans which offer full portability but
involve high charges and no employer obligation to contribute. Instead, the re-
cent mis-selling of personal pension plans has proven to be a major and costly
mistake and with fully portable occupational pensions, this crisis might have been
averted. Another consequence of non-portability is that part-time workers and
women who may spend years out of the labour force while their children grow
up have lower participation rates in occupational pension schemes. Workers in
high turnover occupations may opt to remain in SERPS (the State Earnings Re-
lated Pension Scheme), posing further financial burdens on the government. In
1See (Occupational Pensions Board 1981) for an early expression of this concern in respect of
U.K. schemes.
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addition, pension plans provide substantial tax relief to corporations, and if ac-
tuarial formulae do not account appropriately for early leavers, pension schemes
may build up artificial surpluses and impose higher tax burdens on the rest of the
population. Furthermore, actuarial formulae may incorporate an age bias if they
have an implicit rising contribution rate for older workers, making it unprofitable
for firms to hire or retain such workers.
In this report, we review how early leavers from pension schemes are penal-
ized because:
 Pension rights are based on the final salary in each job, rather than at retire-
ment. This will lead to lower benefits if there is real earnings growth over
the life cycle.
 If employees leave a scheme during the vesting period, they will lose their
pension rights.
 If preserved (deferred) rights are not indexed to real earnings growth or to
the real return on securities, then early leavers will be penalized relative to
stayers.
 There are penalties and variations associated with the calculation of transfer
values to other pension schemes (including defined contribution schemes),
or welfare costs of remaining in a defined benefit scheme when individual
circumstances have changed.
These four penalties were identified in respect of UK pension schemes in
the recentRetirement Income Inquiry(see (Johnson, Disney, and Stears 1996),
p. 136)),2 but they also arise in the defined benefit schemes of other industrialized
countries (see, e.g., (Turner 1993) and (Turner and Watanabe 1995)). In addition,
once a pension is in payment, the pensioner will suffer a detriment if the pension
is not fully indexed to inflation. In Chapter 3, we analyze the effect on portability
and preservation of pension rights in the UK of both current legislation and current
actuarial guidance. In the light of this, we are able to quantify the size of portabil-
ity losses faced by early leavers under different prescribed circumstances (Chapter
4).3 This, in turn, enables us to estimate the portability losses experienced by dif-
ferent types of workers in the U.K. (Chapter 5).We show that, using standard
actuarial assumptions, typical workers may lose up to30% of their pension due
2These were also the four areas of concern of the OFT’s inquiry as expressed in our terms of
reference.
3Aspects of this analysis have been conducted before in the US (see, eg, (Hay/Huggins Com-
pany 1988) and (Gustman and Steinmeier 1989))
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to early leaver penalties;even these penalties may be understated because of var-
ious charges, exclusions and variations in assumptions that are permitted to be
made in calculating transfer values. In Chapter 6, we evaluate actuarial discretion
and analyze the dependence of transfer value calculations on different actuarial
parameters; we conclude that variations in actuarial assumptions can have a large
effect on transfer values. In Chapter 7, we examine how the issue of portability
and preservation of pension rights is treated in some other countries with funded
defined benefit schemes.
Although early leavers are penalized under the current system, there are some
economic arguments in support of an early leaver penalty. These arguments fo-
cus on the deferred pay feature built into defined benefit pension plans which is
intended to raise worker retention rates, thereby increasing incentives for firms to
invest in employee training. Thus, partly non-portable pensions can help counter-
act any tendency by firms to underprovide for training. However, non-portability
is a two-edged sword: at the same time as it stimulates hiring, it also makes it
harder for workers to switch to more efficient and better paid jobs. The structure
of pension schemes therefore have implications for the allocation of labour in the
economy. In Chapter 2, we review the literature on portability and the preser-
vation of pension rights within the context of an analysis of the economics of
pensions and labour mobility. Our main conclusion is that, even if one believes
that there is an underprovision of training and a need for government incentives
to counteract this, tax inducements for non-portable occupational pensions are
a blunt instrument to use. The time it takes to amortize training costs is much
shorter than the time to retirement; the young worker considering changing jobs
is more likely to be influenced by instruments with shorter duration such as em-
ployee stock options and profit sharing, and the company considering investing
in new workers is more likely to be affected by shorter-term instruments such as
training subsidies. In addition, defined benefit pension plans place large risks on
firms that provide pensions, since an ageing workforce renders them increasingly
unattractive to corporations, in spite of the tax advantages.
While a mandatory, portable defined contribution pension scheme, such as im-
plemented in Chile, Australia and elsewhere, is probably the best overall approach
to maximizing labour market flexibility (Blake 1992), this may not be a feasi-
ble policy option in the short run. We therefore propose in Chapter 8 that early
leavers receive a sliding scale cash equivalent of their accrued benefits which is a
weighted average of contributions and projected benefits; the young will receive
fairer treatment than at present, while early leaver benefits for the old will con-
tinue much as at present. We illustrate the effect of this policy proposal using the
lifetime earnings profiles of some typical UK men and women workers and show
that it substantially reduces portability losses while not imposing further risks on
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firms.4
4Our proposal also has implications for women as well as pensions-and-divorce cases.
Chapter 2
Economic Theory of Pensions and
the Mobility of Labour
2.1 The Tax Advantages of Pension Savings
Private pensions offer powerful inducements to save for old age, thereby providing
the source of additional investment capital needed to stimulate economic growth,
as well as helping to reduce the burden on the government of providing for the
aged. To illustrate, consider a worker who faces the choice between putting$1
into a private pension plan or saving it in a unit trust (mutual fund) until retirement.
If the worker puts money into the unit trust, he or she must first pay taxes on his
or her earnings and then must pay taxes on both investment income and realized
capital gains. On the other hand, wage income put in an occupational pension or
personal pension plan is not taxed and neither is the investment income or capital
gains; at retirement, the accumulated fund is taxed, although normally at a lower
effective rate because of the possibility of taking a tax-free lump-sum, there are
no National Insurance contributions payable and there is often a lower rate of
income tax at retirement.1 To give a simple illustration of the magnitude of these
inducements to save for retirement, Table (2.1) presents the ratio of what the$1 of
pension contributions is worth at retirement relative to$1 placed in a unit trust.2
1However, there are Inland Revenue limits on how much can be saved via an approved pension
scheme.
2We assume that the income tax rate is23% in work and17% in retirement. In retirement,
assuming a tax rate of23% and that25% of the pension can be commuted into a tax-free lump
sum, then the effective tax rate is17%. This calculation is for a money purchase scheme; defined
benefit schemes are more complex, but the tax inducements and the percentage of the pension
which is tax free are roughly similar (assuming an annuity factor of12:5 (as discussed in Chapter
6 below) and that 300% of the initial annual pension can be taken as a tax-free lump sum). The
specific formula used in Table (2.1) is (1 
0)[1+r]R
(1 )[1+r(1 )]R
where 0 is the tax rate at retirement,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Years to Retirement Investment Return Relative Value of Pension
40 8.0 % 2.14
30 8.0 % 1.80
20 8.0 % 1.52
10 8.0 % 1.28
40 10.0 % 2.51
30 10.0 % 2.03
20 10.0 % 1.65
10 10.0 % 1.33
40 12.0 % 2.92
30 12.0 % 2.28
20 12.0 % 1.78
10 12.0 % 1.38
Table 2.1: Value of pension savings relative to non-tax-favoured savings.
The average long-term rate of return on UK equities is about10% per annum (on
a risk-adjusted basis); using this rate over the same 40 year investment horizon,
Table (2.1) shows that for each$1 of savings accumulated in a unit trust after 40
years, there will be$2:51 of pension savings.
The effect of the tax advantages of savings using the pension scheme can also
be illustrated in a simple diagram, Fig. (2.1), representing an individual’s choice
between consumption and savings over the life cycle expressed in two periods:
‘young’ (i.e., in work) and ‘old’ (i.e., in retirement). The horizontal axis shows
consumption when young and the vertical axis represents consumption when old.
The worker earns a wageW when young and can reallocate consumption be-
tween youth and old age along his/her budget constraint (WF) (whose slope is
determined by the after-tax return on direct savings). With the availability of sav-
ings through a tax-favoured pension scheme, the worker earns a higher return by
putting money into the pension scheme rather than into direct savings, so that it
is possible to move along the bold broken line (WG). Preferences are captured
by the indifference curvesUP andU0 which express tradeoffs workers are willing
to make and be equally well off. With the additional tax advantages, the worker
chooses to save more (CW rather thanC0W ) and enjoy a higher retirement con-
sumption than otherwise (P rather thanP0).
Firms in Britain also have tax incentives to make contributions to occupational
pensions schemes and these date from shortly after World War I, but the incentives
is the tax rate during the working life,r is the rate of return on investments andR is the number
of years to retirement. This formula is simple and illustrative but the qualitative results would not
change if it were made more complex to encompass additional institutional details.
Pensions Portability in the U.K. 14
P
C0C W
P0
UP
U0
G
F
Figure 2.1: The effects of pensions on savings.
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Figure 2.2: Ratio of private pension wealth to total wealth (Source: (Blake and
Orszag 1997))
started to become particularly strong as a result of the high taxation of corporate
profits after World War II and subsequent changes in tax rules such as those in the
Finance Acts of 1956 and 1970 (c.f., (Blake 1995)). The result has been a steady
increase in the ratio of private pension wealth to total wealth in the UK (which, in
addition to private pension wealth, comprises housing assets, net financial assets
and the value of basic state and SERPS pension wealth) as shown in Fig. (2.2)(c.f.,
(Blake and Orszag 1997)). Currently, the assets of private pension funds amount
to three-quarters the size of the gross domestic product of the UK.
2.2 Pensions Portability
Most pension schemes in the UK are of the defined benefit type in which the size
of the pension is related to the final salary and length of service instead of the level
of contributions (and returns on these) as is the case with a money purchase or
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defined contribution schemes ((Government Actuary’s Department 1994), Table
5.2). This introduces complications for the pension portability for early leavers.
‘Pension portability’ is defined asthe capacity to carry the actuarially fair value
of accrued pension rights from one job to the next((Turner 1993), p. 6). Similarly,
‘portability loss’ is defined asthe shortfall of actual retirement benefits from those
that would have been paid if there had been no change in scheme membership as
a consequence of job changes (either voluntarily or as a result of redundancy or
firing) during the career((Ippolito 1986)).
Pension portability is associated with the portability of benefits, service or as-
sets. Benefits are portable when a scheme member has a vested right to the real
value of benefits accrued in the scheme at the time of leaving, in the sense that
the accrued rights are indexed up to the retirement date in precisely the same way
as would apply to a scheme member who remains in the scheme until retirement.
Service is portable when the years of service in one scheme generate an equiva-
lent number of ‘added years’ in a new scheme. Pension assets are portable when
the scheme member receives a transfer value equal to the cash equivalent of the
accrued benefits.
There are several types of portability loss. For example, scheme members can
lose part or all of their pension rights if they leave during the vesting period or if
they have a deferred pension from a scheme that is uprated to the retirement date
at a less favourable rate than if they had remained in the scheme. Similarly, they
can lose part of their pension rights if fewer than the equivalent number of added
years are awarded in the new scheme.
Policies to reduce portability loss include ((Turner 1993), ch. 9): earlier vest-
ing, indexing of deferred benefits to either price or wage inflation (i.e., calculat-
ing the present value of benefits by discounting future liabilities using a nominal
market interest rate and then indexing that value to the growth in retail prices or
national average earnings: in the latter case portability loss would be virtually
eliminated), providing deferred indexed annuities, full service credit on transfer
between jobs (also virtually eliminates portability loss, but provides a disincen-
tive to employ older workers (Hutchens 1986)), a portability clearing house to
administer asset transfers between schemes or to operate a central portability pen-
sion fund on a defined contribution basis, and moving over entirely to a system
based on defined contributions. Many of the problems related to portability loss
will be eliminated by the trend experienced in most industrialized countries away
from defined benefit schemes towards defined contribution schemes. However, a
different range of problems might have to be confronted in such circumstances:
eg, high set-up and operating costs, inadequate and irregular contributions, high
drop-out rates, low early surrender values, high volatility of fund values around
the retirement date, and uncompetitive (i.e., actuarially unfair) annuity rates at
retirement.
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2.3 Economic Arguments On Portability Losses
Pension portability losses may be seen within the wider context of the design of an
efficient labour contract (and in particular the design of an efficient pension con-
tract) between a firm and its workers (Blinder 1981). Workers wish to have the
best deal possible for their skills and circumstances and may well move between
firms to achieve this. However, by doing so, workers could suffer a portability
loss in terms of their pensions. But there is a countervailing argument based on
the theory of equalizing differentials, which states that workers do not necessarily
give up net pension wealth when they change jobs. This is because (unless they
are fired or made redundant) they typically choose to move to jobs with higher
pay, so that they can recoup any gross pension loss from leaving one job by earn-
ing greater pension rights in subsequent jobs; i.e., they can offset portability loss
through higher pension benefits in future jobs.
But why should workers have to suffer any portability loss at all when they
move jobs? Surely, portability loss just penalizes the most dynamic and efficient
workers in the economy? A potential justification lies in the costs incurred by
firms in managing and training their workers. There are three types of costs in-
volved: the costs of training workers when they first join; the costs of monitoring
the efficiency of their workforce on the job; and the costs of retaining on the pay-
roll workers who have grown old and infirm. Firms can help to minimize these
costs through the design of their pension scheme.
In other words, a firm can use the promise of a pension to provide an appro-
priate range of incentives to its workers. For example, the firm is more likely to
invest in worker training and hence improve both worker productivity and wages
if the trained workers can be persuaded to stay with the company through the
promise of a pension that would otherwise be reduced if they left before the firm
had recovered its training costs. Once trained, a worker has an incentive to move
to a better paid job elsewhere, with the new firm also benefiting from the acquired
skills of the worker without having to pay the training costs. The portability loss
incurred on the pension scheme acts as a disincentive to such a move (Becker
1964). Similarly, the pension can be used to persuade a worker not to shirk in
jobs where the efficiency of the worker is difficult to monitor. A defined benefit
pension acts as a form of deferred compensation whose value increases over time
and is at risk of being forfeited if the employer discovers that workers are shirking
and fires them (Lazear 1979). If the size of the portability loss is set equal to the
costs incurred by the firm in training its workers and of subsequently monitoring
their performance, then the resulting job turnover that will still inevitably occur
will be set at an efficient level. This is because the portability loss acts both to
encourage training and to discourage shirking, while at the same time ensuring
efficient job matching in the wider economy. Finally, a pension scheme can also
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be used to induce the retirement of old workers once their productivity has fallen
below their wage rate. This is because the pension scheme can be designed to re-
ward additional service beyond an optimal retirement age (as decided by the firm)
in an actuarially unfair manner ((Fabel 1994) and (Lazear 1979)).
There is substantial evidence that this happens (see, eg, (Mitchell 1982) and
(Allen, Clark, and McDermed 1993)), but precisely how does it do so? First, most
pension schemes are defined benefit schemes and they help to reduce turnover be-
cause they are ‘backloaded’ ((Bulow 1982), (Ippolito 1987), (Kotlikoff and Wise
1989) and (Lazear and Moore 1988)). This means that benefits (in relation to earn-
ings) increase more rapidly the closer a worker is to retirement, since the benefit
is based on final salary at retirement and this is generally much higher than salary
earlier in the career. Each year of service late in the career of an employee buys
a much bigger pension entitlement than a year of service early in the career. To-
tal benefits depend on total service and final salary and both increase with tenure.
There are therefore strong financial disincentives to early mobility (although some
researchers dispute the extent of the financial disincentives (Gustman and Stein-
meier 1995) or productivity effects (Dorsey 1995)). However, over a career as
a whole, the ‘portability loss schedule’ (which showsthe difference between the
value of the accrued benefits assuming an individual remains in the scheme until
retirement and the value of the accrued benefits if that person leaves the scheme,
as a function of their age at leaving) is inverse U-shaped (as illustrated in Fig.
(4.2) below). The portability loss is low early in the career because both service
and earnings are low. It rises with service as benefits accumulate, reaching a peak
for individuals in their 40s or 50s. But it then declines as the gap between early
leaving and retirement age earnings narrows. At the retirement age itself, the
portability loss reduces to zero. From the employer’s position, backloading has
two effects: the incentive in a downturn to layoff workers with long service and a
disincentive to employ older workers.
Second, pension schemes act as a self-selection mechanism. Workers divide
into ‘stayers’ and ‘leavers’ and the existence of a backloaded pension scheme can
be used by a firm to provide an incentive for stayers to join the firm and to discour-
age people who know they are likely to be early leavers (Salop and Salop 1976).
Third, jobs with pension schemes appear to offer a ‘compensation premium’ over
those without pensions and this helps to reduce turnover in jobs offering pensions;
the evidence supporting this argument is that turnover is higher in jobs without
pensions than in jobs offering pensions, whether the pensions offered are back-
loaded (as in defined benefit schemes) or not (as in defined contribution schemes
with age-independent contribution rates) (Gustman and Steinmeier 1995).
The deliberate backloading of defined benefit pensions reflects the original
(nineteenth century, Victorian) view of pensions as a reward for loyal service by
deserving, long-staying workers. That view extended well into the twentieth cen-
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tury in the U.K.. It was not until May 1990 when the European Court of Justice
ruled that pensions were equivalent to deferred pay within the definition of Article
119 of the Treaty of Rome that a more modern interpretation of pensions began
to take hold. The use of a pension scheme in an attempt to influence and regu-
late worker behaviour over their working lifetimes was always going to be a fairly
blunt instrument; the evolution of labour markets has made this instrument even
blunter. There are other more flexible ways of influencing worker behaviour at
different points in their careers, such as employee stock options, training subsi-
dies, performance-related pay, team compensation, and more variable compensa-
tion profiles for older employees (c.f., (Lazear 1995) for details and examples).
Because the duration of pension liabilities is not well-matched to that of training
liabilities, nonportable pensions are not the best instrument for promoting hiring
and securing employee loyalty.
2.4 Summary
The main conclusions from this chapter are:
1. Private pensions provide tax incentives to encourage savings. This leads to
increased retirement income, more investment and fewer retirement liabili-
ties that need to be met from government spending on state schemes.
2. In the absence of more direct and precise instruments for dealing with un-
recovered training costs, monitoring employee performance and inducing
retirement in a world where the firm does not have complete knowledge
concerning the type or ability of the workers it employs, the economics
literature argues that the pension scheme will be used (however bluntly) to
deal with these matters. This should not in itself be regarded as unfair: it just
becomes part of the calculation made by rational employees about the costs
and benefits of leaving or staying in a particular job. After all, an employer
in the U.K. is not obliged to operate a pension scheme or to contribute to an
employee’s own personal pension scheme.
3. There are two key issues of public policy concern:
(a) Is the portability loss workers suffer actuarially unfair in the sense
of being higher than needed to recover training and monitoring
costs? In this case, the early leaver would be unfairly exploited by
the firm. Although all these various ‘costs’ are difficult to determine
and given a monetary value, the fact that there appears to be such a
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wide variation in the size of the portability loss experienced by differ-
ent workers in otherwise similar circumstances makes this a matter of
legitimate public concern.
(b) Are the government tax incentives for occupational pension sche-
mes well-targeted? There are substantial tax inducements in occu-
pational pension plans and underprovision of training may be a legit-
imate public policy concern (Booth and Snower 1996). However, if
firms are providing non-portable, firm-specific training, these tax in-
centives may not be well-targeted.
Chapter 3
The Impact of Legislation and
Actuarial Guidance on the
Portability and Preservation of
Occupational Pension Rights in the
UK
This chapter analyzes the effect of legislation on the rights of ‘early leavers’ (peo-
ple who move to a new job and cease to be members of their existing occupational
pension scheme) and reviews the state of actuarial practice as specified in the Insti-
tute and Faculty of Actuaries Guidance Notes (Institute and Faculty of Actuaries
1996). The outcome of U.K. legislation over the past two decades has been a
dramatic improvement in the position of early leavers. Portability losses are still
large, however. In addition, early leaver benefits are subject to a large degree of
actuarial discretion that can dramatically affect their size. Nevertheless, we recog-
nize that discretion is important because the circumstances of individual workers
and individual pension schemes can differ tremendously. At the same time, how-
ever, it is likely that the most recent legislation (namely the 1995 Pensions Act)
and the most recent revisions to the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries Guidance
Notes will have some negative effects on early leaver benefits.
Under the current rules, individuals who change jobs and leave an occupa-
tional scheme can receive the ‘cash equivalent’ of their accrued pension benefits
in the form of either a deferred pension or a transfer value. Before 1975, individu-
als had no such rights. We will illustrate the evolution of the rights of early leavers
using the formula for the present value of the pension benefits at retirement of an
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individual who joins a pension scheme at agetk 1 and leaves at aget:1
P (tk 1; t) = a(t  tk 1)W (t)R(t; tN)A(tN )D(t; tN) (3.1)
where:
 – a constant between 0 and 1 which captures the degree to which pension
benefits are vested at the time of leaving,
a – the accrual rate (typically1
60
),
tk 1 – the age at entry into the scheme,
t – the current age of the scheme member,
tN – the normal retirement age of the scheme member,
W (t) – the pensionable salary at aget,
R(t; tN) – the revaluation factor describing how benefits are uprated when
wages and/or prices increase between agest andtN ,
A(tN) – the annuity factor (the present value of a pension annuity of$1 per
annum) at retirement agetN (typically lies between12  16),
D(t; tN) – the discount factor (

1
1+r
tN t if the discount rater is constant).
Eq. (3.1) shows that the pension benefit accrued at the time of leaving (as-
suming complete vesting; i.e., = 1) is the product of the accrual rate (a), years
of service (t   tk 1) and leaving salary (W (t)). The present value (at the time
of leaving) of the corresponding pension benefits payable from retirement age is
found by revaluing the accrued benefit to retirement age by the revaluation factor
R(t; tN ), capitalizing the subsequent stream of pension payments (multiplying by
A(tN )) and then discounting this capitalized sum back to the leaving date (multi-
plying byD(t; tN)).2
From the point of view of the scheme, transfer values and deferred benefits
have identical present values. However, from the early leaver’s point of view, s/he
is likely to have private information about career prospects in the new firm and
may well value these two prospects differently. If career progression is projected
to occur at a faster rate in the new firm than the old, the transfer value will result
in a larger pension at retirement than the deferred benefit.
Deferred pensions and transfer values are of interest when workers change or
leave a pension scheme. Since most pension schemes are job-specific, this is likely
to occur when a worker changes jobs, but it may also occur if the worker wants
to switch to a personal pension scheme. The public sector operates a portability
1This formula is presented to illustrate conceptually the evolution of UK legislation and ac-
tuarial practice on portability. In practice, actuarial formulae are somewhat more complex and
may account for spouse’s benefits and a variety of discretionary benefits. Complete formulae are
presented in Appendices B and C.
2The concepts of discounting and capitalizing are reviewed in ((Blake 1990), Ch. 3).
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clearing house in the form of a Transfer Club through which years of service in
public sector schemes are fully transferable; such a system works well if the inflow
of workers into a particular scheme is similar to the outflow. Some private pension
plans are also industry-wide (e.g., electricity, railroads, university lecturers), so
that workers who change jobs within this small subset of industries do not suffer
portability loss either.
3.1 Portability Between 1975 and 1985
Before 1975, early leavers in the UK had no right under law to transfer their
accrued pension entitlement to a new scheme or even to have a deferred pension
from their old scheme. In Eq. (3.1), this corresponds to = 0. In practice,
however, some schemes provided a frozen, deferred pension to early leavers (i.e.,
a pension related to the salary at the time of leaving, rather than at the time of
retirement). This situation corresponds to = 1 andR(t; tN) = 1 in Eq. (3.1).
SettingR(t; tN ) = 1 means that early leavers lost out on two fronts compared
with the stayers. First, the pension entitlement accrued by the time they left a
scheme did not benefit from subsequent career progression. This is because real
salaries at retirement are typically higher than real salaries earlier in the career,
and long stayers benefit by havingall their years of pensionable service valued
in relation to theirsalary at retirementrather than theirleaving salary(as is the
case with early leavers). This meant that early leavers’ ‘frozen’ pensions did not
benefit from productivity growth. Second, the leaving salary of early leavers is
a given nominal amount, and so its real value fell over time, whenever there was
an increase in retail prices between the leaving and retirement dates. In other
words, the deferred pensions of early leavers were frozen in the sense of not being
protected or preserved against inflation.
The worker who stayed with the firm until retirement at retirement agetN
would have had a final salary proportional toR(t; tN) = [(1 + g)(1 + )]
tN t in-
stead ofR(t; tN) = 1 used in computing early leaver benefits; hereg is the growth
rate inreal wages and is the inflation rate in retail prices. The term in square
brackets is therefore oneplus the average growth rate innominalwages between
the leaving and retirement ages. The effects on a frozen pension of different in-
flation rates between the leaving and retirement dates are shown in Fig. (3.1),
assuming real wages grow at a rate of2% p.a.3 For example, with an inflation rate
of 6:74% (the average retail price inflation rate over the past forty years), anyone
leaving a frozen, deferred pension with just 10 years to retirement would end up
3The average annual growth rate in real wages between 1955 and 1995 was2:09% p.a., while
the average rate of retail price inflation was6:74% p.a.; however, the rate of inflation was much
higher in the 1970s, averaging13:67% p.a.
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Years to Retirement Inflation Rate % of Full Service Pension
40 5 % 6.43 %
30 5 % 12.77 %
20 5 % 25.36 %
10 5 % 50.36 %
40 6.74 % 3.33 %
30 6.74 % 7.80 %
20 6.74 % 18.26 %
10 6.74 % 42.73 %
40 10 % 1.00 %
30 10 % 3.16 %
20 10 % 10.00 %
10 10 % 31.63 %
40 13.67 % 0.27 %
30 13.67 % 1.18 %
20 13.67 % 5.19 %
10 13.67 % 22.78 %
Table 3.1: Early leaver penalties with a frozen pension.
with a pension worth only 43% of one that was fully indexed against inflation.
In 1975, the Social Security Act of 1973 came into effect and this required
pensions to be vested after a period of five years for those over 26 years of age.
In Eq. (3.1), this corresponds to = 0 for the first five years that a member is in
a scheme and = 1 thereafter.4 The Social Security Act still did not require any
uprating of the deferred pension (i.e.,R(t; tN) = 1) and so the penalties suffered
by early leavers from both real wage growth and inflation continued.
3.2 Portability between 1985 and the 1995 Pensions
Act
The position of early leavers was further improved in a series of legislation that
included the Social Security Acts of 1985, 1986 and 1990. These provided for
the uprating of deferred pensions to account for inflation up to a maximum of 5%
per annum compound from April 1978 for those leaving occupational schemes
4Employee contributions are generally refunded so that, for schemes which have employee
contributions, the effective value of is between 0 and 1.
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after January 1991.5 The 1985 Act also allowed those leaving employment to
transfer the value of their accrued pension to another scheme or to a particular
type of insurance policy called a section 32 buy-out policy (see (Blake 1995),
sec. 6.4.2), (Freshfields Employment, Pensions and Benefits Department 1995),
((Fenton, Ham, and Sabel 1995), chs 6,10 and 11), and ((Reardon 1997), ch. 16)).
In addition, the vesting period for employer contributions was reduced to two
years by the Social Security Act of 1986.
In terms of Eq. (3.1), the effect of this legislation was to to enhance portability
so that = 0 for the first two years of scheme membership and = 1 thereafter.
In addition, it also gave early leavers a choice between accepting a pension at
retirement in the leaving scheme, revalued for inflation up to a maximum of5%
(R(t; tN ) = (1+ )tN t where = min(0:05; ) and is the realized (compound
or geometric average) inflation rate) or taking a cash transfer value (computed by
the leaving scheme’s actuary) to a new scheme.6 In comparison, the worker who
stayed with the firm to retirement at agetN would have had a final salary pro-
portional toR(t; tN) = [(1 + g)(1 + )]
tN t instead ofR(t; tN) = (1 + )tN t
used in computing early leaver benefits.7 Table (3.2) shows the early leaver penal-
ties at different wage growth and inflation rates. The penalties in Table (3.2) for
early leavers are smaller than those in Table (3.1), but they are still quite sig-
nificant. Under the government’s own Minimum Funding Requirement norms8
(introduced in the 1995 Pensions Act), a worker who leaves his/her job 30 years
prior to retirement only receives slightly over half the full service pension.
If, instead, the worker accepts a transfer value, his/her pension at retirement
depends on the assumptions the actuary makes about a variety of factors, but for
an actuarially fair computation of transfer values, s/he will suffer the same early
leaver penalties as those illustrated in Table (3.2). Issues concerning actuarial
discretion and the specifics of transfer value computation are covered in Chapters
4 and 6 below.
5In addition to the Social Security Acts, there were related Statutory Instruments: the Occu-
pational Pension Schemes (Transfer Values) Regulations 1996 (SI 1996/1847), the Occupational
Pension Schemes (Preservation of Benefit) Regulations 1991 (SI 1991/167), and the Occupational
Pension Schemes (Minimum Funding Requirement and Actuarial Valuations) Regulations 1996
(SI 1996/1536).
6The Occupational Pensions Board (Occupational Pensions Board 1981) recommended that
deferred pensions should be uprated in line with movements in national average earnings, a pro-
posal that would have virtually eliminated portability losses. The 1985 Act was a direct conse-
quence of the OPB report but, in offering only limited price indexation of deferred benefits, the
Act fell short of the OPB’s recommendations.
7The Guaranteed Minimum Pension portion of the contracted-out pension had to be uprated
by the rate of increase in national average earnings but this requirement was removed by the 1995
Pensions Act so is not taken into account here.
8Real wage growth of2% and an inflation rate of4%; see Appendix A.
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Years to Retirement Inflation Wage Growth % of Full Service
(Real) Pension
40 6.74 % 2.0 % 23.47 %
30 6.74 % 2.0 % 33.72 %
20 6.74 % 2.0 % 48.44 %
10 6.74 % 2.0 % 69.60 %
40 4.0 % 2.0 % 45.29 %
30 4.0 % 2.0 % 55.21 %
20 4.0 % 2.0 % 67.30 %
10 4.0 % 2.0 % 82.03 %
40 4.0 % 3.0 % 30.66 %
30 4.0 % 3.0 % 41.20 %
20 4.0 % 3.0 % 55.37 %
10 4.0 % 3.0 % 74.41 %
Table 3.2: Early leaver penalties with limited revaluation
3.3 The State of Current Legislation
One problem with deferred pensions is the difficulty an early leaver has in con-
tacting his/her former pension schemes when s/he retires: they may have changed
addresses, merged with other schemes, or even been wound up. A register of pen-
sion schemes and a tracing service have operated in the U.K. only since 1991.
Deferred pensions also pose an administrative burden for occupational schemes.
It is thus a potentially useful option to transfer the cash equivalent of the deferred
pension to another occupational pension scheme or to a personal pension scheme.
The 1995 Pensions Act introduced a number of provisions relating to transfer val-
ues and eliminated the Guaranteed Minimum Pension provisions for contracting
out of SERPS.9
After the Pensions Act of 1995 came into effect on 6 April 1997, the cash
equivalent must be applied in one of the following ways:
1. A refund of the early leaver’s contributions if he/she has been a member
of an occupational pension scheme for less than 2 years (i.e., the vesting
period for UK pension schemes is 2 years).10
9Contracting out now requires schemes to provide Minimum Cash Equivalents and satisfy a
Minimum Funding Requirement. For a readable review of the 1995 Pensions Act, see (McKenna
and Co. 1996). More detailed information is available in (Freshfields Employment, Pensions and
Benefits Department 1995) as well as the relevant DSS consultation papers (Department of Social
Security 1995).
10Although there is no statutory obligation to refund non-vested employee contributions, it is
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2. Used to buy a deferred or preserved pension payable at normal retirement
age in the leaving scheme or in the new employer’s scheme if the new em-
ployer is willing to provide this deferred pension.
3. Used to finance the transfer of service to a new employer’s exempt approved
occupational pension scheme on a defined benefit basis (i.e., the transfer
value is used to buy ‘added years’ in the new scheme); the new employer
must be able and willing to accept this transfer.
4. Used to buy ‘protected rights’ to a pension annuity on a defined contribution
(or money purchase) basis either in:
(a) a new employer’s scheme (if the employer is able and willing to accept
this transfer into his/her contracted-out money purchase scheme), or
(b) an appropriate personal pension scheme (first permitted from 1 July
1988 by the 1986 Social Security Act), or
(c) a section 32 buy-out policy (a policy arranged by insurance companies
which provides deferred annuities and is named after the section of the
1981 Finance Act that first permitted such schemes).
If an employee leaves a scheme that has been contracted-out of SERPS be-
fore completing 2 years of qualifying service, s/he will generally receive a lump
sum cash payment equal to the sum of the contributions s/he has paid into the
scheme.11 But s/he is not entitled to any interest on these contributions (although
the employer may add interest) or to the contributions made on his/her behalf by
the employer. In addition, the lump sum is taxed at 20%. If the original contri-
butions were relieved at 23%, this means that every$100 of contributions costs
$77 and returns$80 if this right is exercised.
The Pension Schemes Act 1993 states that “A scheme must provide for short
service benefit to be computed on the same basis as long service benefit” (s74(1)).
This implies that benefits must accrue uniformly at a constant fraction (eg, 1/60th
for each year of service) of final pensionable pay (as of the date of retirement in
the case of long service benefit (LSB) and of the date of leaving service in the
case of short service benefit (SSB)). The short service benefit becomes a deferred
pension at normal retirement age in the leaving scheme. Between the leaving date
and the retirement date, the SSB has to be revalued according to rules that depend
on the leaving date.
the general practice to do so.
11However, the employer is entitled to deduct the implicit cost that the scheme has incurred in
providing death-in-service and invalidity benefits for its members.
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For someone leaving a scheme on or after 1 January 1991, the following rules
apply. Pension benefits accrued before 6 April 1978 (the date SERPS came into
operation) are subject to ‘limited price indexation’ (LPI) between the leaving and
retirement dates. LPI involves uprating the deferred pension by the rate of re-
tail price inflation up to a limit of 5% pa compound (LPI was first introduced by
the 1990 Social Security Act). For pension benefits accrued on or after 6 April
1978 but before 6 April 1997, the component of these benefits in excess of the
‘Guaranteed Minimum Pension’ (GMP) are subject to LPI between the leaving
and retirement dates. The GMP for both the member and widow/er (which be-
tween 6 April 1978 and 5 April 1997 schemes had to provide in order to contract
out of SERPS) has to be revalued between the leaving date and state pension age
in one of three ways: (a) by full revaluation in line with increases in national av-
erage earnings (known as revaluation of earnings factors or ‘section 148 orders’),
(b) by ‘limited rate revaluation’, namely 5% p.a. compound plus the payment of
a limited revaluation premium to the National Insurance Fund to cover increases
in national average earnings in excess of 5% p.a. compound; or (c) ‘fixed rate
revaluation’ of 6.25% p.a. compound for those leaving after 6 April 1997, 7% p.a.
compound for those leaving between 6 April 1993 and 5 April 1997, 7.5% p.a.
compound for those leaving between 6 April 1988 and 5 April 1993, and 8.5%
p.a. compound for those leaving before 6 April 1988.12
For someone leaving a scheme before 1 January 1991, the GMP is revalued
as above, but only the pension in excess of the GMP that is accrued on or after
1 January 1985 is subject to LPI between the leaving and retirement dates. For
someone leaving a scheme on or after 6 April 1997, limited rate revaluation ceased
to be an option for revaluing the deferred GMP that had been accrued up till this
date. The GMP ceased to accrue from this date, and all of the SSBs accruing after
this date is subject to LPI between the leaving and retirement dates. These are
minimum requirements and do not prevent schemes acting more generously than
this (up to Inland Revenue limits).
Once in payment, the general rule is that the SSB is subject to LPI (so long as
the pensioner is above 55 years of age, unless s/he is permanently incapacitated
by mental or physical infirmity from engaging in full-time employment). How-
ever, the component of the SSB constituting the deferred GMP is fully indexed
to retail price inflation once it is in payment (this is because it corresponds to the
SERPS pension that it replaced and which is itself fully indexed). For GMP rights
accrued between 6 April 1978 and 5 April 1988, the full amount of uprating once
in payment is paid for by the Department of Social Security via the state pension.
For GMP rights accrued between 6 April 1988 and 5 April 1997, the scheme itself
is responsible for meeting increases in the retail price index up to a maximum of
12Note that public service schemes pay full price indexation on the full pension.
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3% pa, with the DSS paying any difference between 3% and full indexation again
via the state pension.
Turning now to benefits that are transferred from one scheme to another, the
rules are as follows. Anyone leaving a scheme (or, for those leaving service af-
ter 1 January 1996, anyone who has ever left a deferred pension in a previous
scheme) has the right to have the cash equivalent of his/her accrued rights trans-
ferred to a new scheme and this right can be exercised up to one year before
the leaving scheme’s normal retirement age. The cash equivalent represents the
present value of the future benefits to which the employee is entitled as of the
date the transfer value is requested, taking into account any increases, statutory or
discretionary, that would apply to the benefits had they remained preserved in the
scheme. The calculation of the cash equivalent must be undertaken by a qualified
actuary as specified in Guidance Note 11 of the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries
(see Chapter 4 below). This sum is guaranteed for 3 months and must be paid
within 6 months of a request for a transfer.13 The sum must be shown in a written
‘statement of entitlement’ sent to the early leaver. Failure to comply with these
conditions can lead to monetary penalties being imposed on the trustees by the
Occupational Pensions Regulatory Authority (OPRA).
The receiving scheme must also assume the GMP liabilities of the transferring
member (accrued until 5 April 1997). From 6 April 1997, only the following pos-
sibilities are available in respect of an early leaver’s GMP. It can remain deferred
in the leaving scheme, transferred to another contracted-out salary-related scheme,
converted into protected rights in a contracted-out money purchase scheme or an
appropriate personal pension scheme, or bought out with a section 32 buy-out pol-
icy. The scheme of the new employer is not obligated to accept the transfer. The
transfer may take the form of a deferred benefit or money purchase credit, but,
according to the Government Actuary’s Department and surveys of the National
Association of Pension Funds (NAPF), most transfers take the form of service
credits, and, for public schemes, this is the only option.
If the early leaver places the transfer value in a regular premium personal pen-
sion scheme, the initial charges are ordinarily quite high, possibly up to25% of
the value of any initial lump sum contribution. Thus, after receiving the transfer
value, the worker loses another substantial fraction of it to charges.14 Further,
personal pensions tend to have relatively high annual charges imposed on addi-
tional regular premiums with the average annual percentage charge being about
2:5% ((Blake 1995), sec. 7.3.4). In addition to losing a substantial fraction of
the incoming transfer value, the worker also bears all the asset market risk on the
13If payment would reduce the security of benefits of other members, payment may be delayed
or reduced (Sec. 5.1 of GN11).
14Workers could instead put the transfer value into a low commission single-premium personal
pension scheme for which charges might be only4% but such schemes are not well-advertized.
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scheme’s investments.
3.4 Implementation of the Laws on Cash Equiva-
lents
The actuarial profession has to implement the legislation on transfer values and
the preservation of pension rights and does so on the basis of Guidance Notes pub-
lished by the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries (Institute and Faculty of Actuaries
1996). The most relevant ones are:
1. Guidance Note 11: Retirement Benefit Schemes - Transfer Values
2. Guidance Note 26: Pension Fund Terminology
3. Guidance Note 27: Retirement Benefit Schemes - Minimum Funding Re-
quirement
We will review these particular guidance notes in terms of the specific information
on computing transfer values.15
Guidance Note 11 (GN11) provides the key framework for actuarial practice
on the calculation of transfer values. A new version of GN11 was released to
satisfy the requirements of the Pensions Act of 1995. GN11 only applies to in-
dividual transfer values where a cash equivalent under the Pension Schemes Act
of 1993 applies and to the valuation of director’s pensions in annual reports. The
Secretary of State for Social Security has also approved GN11 for valuing pen-
sion benefits in divorce.16 The new version of GN11 now includes the treatment
of the effects of the Minimum Funding Requirement for contracted-out schemes
(evaluated using GN28) and has more stringent rules and allows less discretion on
the computation of Minimum Cash Equivalents than other pension liabilities. The
key principle for computing transfer values is that they should equal the actuarial
value of preserved benefits (GN11 version 7.0, 3.1):
15Other guidance notes of the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries relevant to pensions are: Guid-
ance Note 3 (Certificates for the Occupational Pensions Board), Guidance Note 4 (Insolvency of
Employers: Safeguard of Occupational Pension Scheme Contributions), Guidance Note 9 (Re-
tirement Benefit Schemes - Actuarial Reports), Guidance Note 16 (Retirement Benefit Schemes -
Bulk Transfers), Guidance Note 17 (Accounting for Pension Costs under Statement of Accounting
Practice No. 24), Guidance Note 19 (Retirement Benefit Schemes - Deficiency on Winding Up),
Guidance Note 28 (Adequacy of Benefits for Contracting-out on or after 6 April 1997), Guid-
ance Note 29 (Occupational Pension Schemes - Actuaries Advising the Trustees of a Participating
Employer).
16See (Department of Social Security 1996) for more information on this topic. GN11 has also
been approved in Northern Ireland and Scotland for valuation of pensions benefits in divorce.
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It is a fundamental requirement, stemming from legislation, that a cash
equivalent should represent the actuarial value of the benefits which would
otherwise have been preserved....
In addition, incoming transfers should be valued using the same methods and
assumptions as for outgoing transfers (but with permissible adjustments for pro-
jected salary increases on incoming transfers). The actuary will include discre-
tionary benefits in the calculation of transfer values (unless the trustees prohibit
this). They may also make allowance for early retirement and administrative costs.
Protected rights calculations must be performed for those transferring money to a
money purchase scheme or to an appropriate personal pension scheme. There are
also rules for partial cash equivalents for those who remain with the firm but who
switch to a personal pension scheme, preserving their accrued benefits in their
original scheme. The actuary is required to certify that the calculations are in ac-
cordance with legislation and actuarial practice; an appendix to GN11 includes a
sample certification to the trustees. Departures from normal bases of calculations
are allowed when the scheme is substantially in deficit or in certain circumstances
where previously added years have been credited.
For Minimum Cash Equivalent calculations, the actuary is required, with some
exceptions, to use the MFR norms stated in GN27 (and reproduced below in Ap-
pendix A). These assumptions cover mortality rates, equity and gilt yields, rates
of inflation, and real wage growth. If the actuary produces a transfer value using
a method which would in aggregate produce Minimum Cash Equivalents for the
whole scheme different from the MFR, s/he is required to inform the trustees.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have reviewed UK legislation on portability and shown how
the rules affect the computation of transfer values and deferred pensions. There
has been a dramatic improvement in pension portability over the past twenty years
but workers who change jobs still suffer substantial portability losses.
In the next chapter, we will use the Guidance Notes published by the Insti-
tute and Faculty of Actuaries to quantify the portability losses suffered by early
leavers. In the following chapter, we estimate that portability loss that would be
experienced by both ‘average’ and ‘typical’ workers in the U.K. on the basis of
different job separation assumptions. We will use MFR norms in our calculations.
Because individual circumstances differ, actuaries have discretion over many of
the assumptions used, particularly in non-Minimum Cash Equivalent cases. We
will subsequently (Chapter 6) analyze the effects of actuarial discretion on transfer
values.
Chapter 4
Quantifying Portability Losses
Based on Current Legislation and
Actuarial Guidance in the UK
In this chapter, we show that there are two types of portability loss faced by early
leavers in the U.K.: a ‘cash equivalent loss’ and a ‘backloading loss’.1
4.1 Cash Equivalent Loss
In order to quantify the size of the cash equivalent loss, we need to follow the
precise methods used by actuaries in valuing the accrued rights of pension scheme
members. These methods differ depending on whether the member is treated as
being a continuing (or ongoing) member of the scheme or treated as being an early
leaver. In the first case, actuaries will use the ‘projected unit method’ (PUM) to
value their accrued rights, while in the second case they will use the ‘current
unit method with revaluation’ (CUM). The first method recognizes that pension
rights accrued to date will cost the scheme more to deliver if the member stays
until retirement, since these rights will depend on the retirement salary which is
typically higher (at least in nominal terms) than the current salary; this method
therefore needs to make projections of the nominal final salary of the member.
The second method takes account of the fact that, for the early leaver, the pension
1We make certain simplifying assumptions. We ignore GMP liabilities as they have been
discontinued. We also assume that incoming and outgoing schemes value death-in-service and
spouse’s benefits, etc. in similar ways. These subtleties are examined in Chapter 6 which reviews
actuarial discretion in computing transfer values. We assume an annuity factor throughout of12:5.
(The choice of annuity factor and its effect on the computation of transfer values are considered
in sec. 6.3 below; however, assuming that actuaries agree on the annuity factor, we show in this
chapter that the choice of annuity factor does not affect the relative portability loss.)
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rights accrued to date are frozen at the current or leaving salary, although under
current legislation this salary is typically revalued using a specified revaluation
factor to retirement age.2 It is because the leaving salary is revalued to retirement
age at a less favourable rate than used to determine the projected final salary that
a portability loss arises in respect of an early leaver’s service in a given pension
scheme.
When an individual leaves his/her pension scheme, s/he can ask the scheme
to calculate the ‘cash equivalent’ of the accrued benefits at the departure date.
The actuary will use the CUM to do this. The early leaver then has the choice
of becoming a deferred member in the leaving scheme (in effect using the cash
equivalent to buy a deferred pension in the leaving scheme) or taking the cash
equivalent as a transfer value into a new scheme (assuming the new scheme is
willing to accept this transfer value). From the leaving scheme’s point of view,
the deferred pension and the transfer value cost the same, so the leaving scheme
will be indifferent as to the choice made by the early leaver (disregarding, of
course, the additional administrative costs involved with the first option). If the
new scheme accepts the transfer value on a defined benefit basis, it will generate
service credits or added years in the new scheme. The number of added years
will be determined using the PUM since the new member will be treated as a
continuing member of the new scheme.
The PUM values the accrued pension of a fully-vested member agedt who
joined the scheme at agetk 1, as follows:3
PPUM(tk 1; t) = a (t  tk 1)W (t)R(t; tN)A(tN)D(t; tN) (4.1)
= a (t  tk 1)W (t) [(1 + g)(1 + )]
tN tA(tN )D(t; tN)
where:
a – the accrual rate (typically1
60
),
tk 1 – the age at entry into the scheme,
t – the current age of the scheme member,
tN – the normal retirement age of the scheme member,
W (t) – the pensionable salary at aget,
R(t; tN) = [(1 + g)(1 + )]
tN t – the revaluation factor describing how ben-
efits are uprated between agest andtN ,
A(tN) – the annuity factor (the present value of a pension annuity of$1 per
annum) at retirement agetN (typically lies between12  16),
2The PUM and CUM are examples of ‘accrued benefits funding methods’.
3For clarity, this formula assumes time-invariant rates of discount and wage growth and a one-
year control period. More generally,PPUM (tk 1; t) = a(t   tk 1)A(tN )PV (W (tN )) where
PV (:) is the present value function.
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g – the growth rate of real wages (MFR norm2%),
 – the inflation rate (MFR norm4%),
r – the discount rate (MFR norm8%  10%),
D(t; tN) – the discount factor (

1
1+r
tN t if the discount rater is constant).
If we take the MFR norms, the PUM projects the final salary of the member
on the basis of a real growth rate in wages ofg = 2% and an inflation rate of4%
(implying a growth in nominal wages of about6% p.a.).
The CUM values the accrued pension of a member agedt who joined the
scheme at agetk 1 as follows:
PCUM(tk 1; t) = a(t  tk 1)W (t) (1 + )
tN tA(tN)D(t; tN) (4.2)
where:
 – revaluation rate for the deferred pension (MFR norm4% p.a.).
In Fig. (4.1) we plot the values of Eq. (4.1) and Eq.(4.2) against the scheme
member’s age using MFR norms. In particular, the discount rate used is the same
as the yield on equities assumed by the MFR (i.e.,9%) until 10 years before
the ‘MFR retirement age’4; in the ten years before the MFR retirement age, the
discount rate is somewhere between9% and8%5; after the normal retirement age,
the appropriate discount rate is the same as the yield on gilts assumed by the MFR
(i.e., 8%); and, if the MFR retirement age is before the normal retirement age, a
discount rate of10% is to be used between the MFR retirement age and the actual
retirement age. The worker is assumed to begin his/her working life at age25 and
retire at65 and has an initial annual salary of$15; 000. In Fig. (4.2), we plot the
difference between Eq. (4.1) and Eq.(4.2); this difference captures the portability
loss (measured along the vertical axis) suffered thefirst timea worker (who joined
a scheme at the age of25) leaves the scheme, as a function of the age of leaving.
Fig. (4.2) shows that theabsolutepenalty for one change of job is inverse
U-shaped. Since the average worker switches jobs at least five times, we need a
formula for the total pension received relative to the pension that would have been
received had the worker worked a full career at a single firmor had an ‘equivalent’
defined contribution scheme. The standard actuarial practice in the U.K. is to use
Eq. (4.2) to value outgoing transfers and Eq. (4.1) to value both incoming trans-
4The MFR retirement age is the earliest age at which a member can retire without a reduction
in pension (Statutory Instrument 1996/1536, Minimum Funding Requirement and Actuarial Val-
uations). For example, for a scheme that allows early retirement without penalty at age 55, the
MFR retirement age is 55. We assume that all workers are pre-MFR retirement age.
5The actual adjustment involves multiplying the formulae Eq. (4.1) and Eq. (4.2) (which are
calculated using a pre-MFR retirement age discount rate of9%) by (1+0:005n)wheren is the
minimum of 10 and the years to MFR retirement age.
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Figure 4.1: Accumulated values of ongoing pension benefit and cash equivalent.
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Figure 4.2: Difference between ongoing pension benefit and cash equivalent.
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Figure 4.3: Relative cash equivalent loss as a proportion of the ongoing pension
benefit.
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fers and the accrued benefits of continuing members. Standard practice therefore
produces a ratio of transfer value to ongoing value of:
(t) =
(1 + )tN t
(1 + g)tN t(1 + )tN t
: (4.3)
Eq. (4.3) shows the fraction of the pension received relative to what would have
been received in the absence of pension portability problems.6
While Fig. (4.2) shows that theabsoluteloss is highest for someone who
leaves a scheme in their 50s, therelative loss of years is greater the further the
early leaver is from retirement. Fig. (4.3) shows the relative cash equivalent loss
is a decreasing function of age. Early leavers are therefore penalized relatively
more than long stayers under current legislation and actuarial practice.
For workers who change jobs multiple times during their careers and always
leave deferred pensions, the total portability loss (PLDP ) is given by:
PLDP =
PN
k=1 (tk) [tk   tk 1]
tN   t0
(4.4)
whereN is the number of jobs held,tk is the leaving age from thekth scheme,
tk 1 is the entry age into thekth scheme, andt0 is the date of entry into the labour
force.7
Suppose instead that the worker always takes transfer values, then the pen-
sion s/he receives depends on theestimatedreal wage growth and inflation uprat-
ing factors chosen by the actuary in the receiving scheme instead of the realized
quantities. Plugging in the actuarial estimates of real wage growth (ĝ) and infla-
tion uprating factor(̂) into the denominator of Eq. (4.3), we obtain̂(t), the ratio
of years of service in the new scheme to those in the old scheme. Since̂(t) < 1
with positive real wage growth, fewer years are credited than years worked. If
a worker who has several jobs always chooses transfer values, his/her portability
loss (PLTV ) is given by:
PLTV =
PN
k=1 ̂(tk) [tk   tk 1]
tN   t0
: (4.5)
6While our formulae do not take into account spouse’s benefit and death prior to retirement,
the result in Eq. (4.3) is robust to altering these assumptions.
7Consider a worker who receives a number of deferred pensions: s/he receives a total pension
proportional to
PN
k=1(tk   tk 1)W (tk)(1 + )
tN tk . The worker who works until retirement
with the same firm receives a pension proportional to(tN   t0)W (tN ). The latter expression
can be written as:(tN   t0)((1 + g)(1 + ))tN t0W (t0) and the former can be written as:PN
k=1(tk tk 1)W (t0) [(1 + g)(1 + )]
tk t0 (1+)tN tk . Taking the ratio of these expressions
produces the formula in Eq. (4.4).
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This formula assumes that the new scheme accepts the transfer values which it is
not legally required to do. This issue will be discussed in more detail below.
To illustrate these formulae, we will assume that the MFR norms are realized
in the sense that the actual outcomes for wage growth and inflation rates and asset
returns correspond exactly to the MFR assumptions. In this case, Eq. (4.4) and Eq.
(4.5) are equal to each other. We consider the cash equivalent loss of an individual
who switches pension schemes several times during his/her career and compare
the resulting pension with that of someone who stayed in a single defined benefit
scheme for their whole career or someone who joined an ‘equivalent’ portable
defined contribution scheme. The constant contribution rate for this ‘equivalent’
defined contribution scheme is determined by the ratio of the the present value
of pension benefits to the compound value of salaries as of the retirement date.8
With MFR norms satisfied, this contribution rate works out to be12:2%. However,
this contribution rate ignores administrative costs as well as the costs of providing
additional benefits (such as death-in-service benefits). With these costs added, the
contribution rate would be closer to the industry average contribution rate of about
15%.
Eq.(4.4) shows thatthe only factors determining portability loss are the ages
at separation and the estimated real growth rate of wages.9 . UK empirical work
indicates that workers hold at least 5 different jobs and that they change jobs much
more frequently when young (Booth, Francesconi, and Garcia-Serrano 1996). We
therefore consider three baseline examples, two of which have workers changing
jobs frequently and one in which a worker only changes jobs once. The first in-
volves a worker (referred to as MFR worker ‘A’) who enters the labour force at
age25 and has separations at ages28; 29; 30; 40; 57 and therefore holds six jobs.
The total pension received is approximately75:12% of that for a full service pen-
sion. The total service credits from the various jobs are shown in Table (4.1).10
Fig. (4.4) shows the accrued defined benefit pension as a fraction of the full ser-
vice defined benefit pension; the black area represents the effect over this worker’s
career of the portability loss implicit in UK pensions legislation.11
As a second baseline example, we consider MFR worker ‘B’ who enters the
labour market at age25 and in early career switches jobs more frequently with
separations at ages26, 27, 30, 31, 38, 44, and55. The total pension received at
8Since expectations are realized, no surpluses or deficits accrue and the funding formula is
equivalent to prospective benefits (or aggregate liability) funding methods such as the attained age
method (see section 4.2 below and (Institute and Faculty of Actuaries 1984))
9This is because the MFR norms are realized over the remaining lifetime of the member, so
that,  and̂ are all equal.
10Note the pensions in the second and third job are not vested, so the accrued service from these
two jobs is zero.
11Because the discretization used is annual, the lines are not vertical at separation dates.
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Separation Age Years Worked Years Accrued
28 3 1.44
29 1 0.0
30 1 0.0
40 10 6.10
57 17 14.51
65 8 8.0
TOTAL 40 30.05
Table 4.1: Service accrual for MFR worker ‘A’
Separation Age Years Worked Years Accrued
26 1 0.0
27 1 0.0
30 3 1.50
31 1 0.0
38 7 4.10
44 6 3.95
55 11 9.02
65 10 10
TOTAL 40 28.58
Table 4.2: Service accrual for MFR worker ‘B’
retirement is approximately71:46% of the full service pension. The pattern of
pension accrual from the various jobs is shown in Table (4.2) and Fig. (4.5).
A third baseline example is a worker (MFR worker ‘C’) who enters the labour
market and stays in a single job for twenty years and is made redundant at age
45, 20 years from normal retirement. The worker immediately finds another job
and remains in that job for the remainder of his/her career.12 This worker receives
only 13:46 years’ credit for20 years of service and loses16% of the value of the
retirement pension as shown in Fig. (4.6). Because the worker does not change
jobs until age45, a full pension is earned up to this point. When the worker is
made redundant, s/he loses about one-third of his/her years of service. However,
by working at another job steadily until retirement, s/he is able to raise his/her
pension to more than four-fifths of the full service pension.13
12This is a reasonable example because the mean elapsed job tenure for men in the U.K. aged
between61 and65 in 1991 was17:75 years ((Burgess and Rees 1994), p. 31).
13These calculations ignore expenses. An earlier study by (Davies 1990) found that the porta-
bility loss was also16% for a worker who leaves a pension scheme 20 years prior to retirement
if no expenses are deducted (his ‘Example 2’); but if expenses are taken into account and certain
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Figure 4.4: Accrued early leaver pension as a proportion of the full service pension
for MFR worker ‘A’.
4.2 Backloading Loss
In addition to the cash equivalent loss a worker faces when changing pension
schemes, there is a second type of potential portability loss which increases with
the age of the early leaver. This loss arises as a result of the backloaded marginal
cost and contributions structure built into the methods (namely, PUM and CUM)
used to determine cash equivalents; thus, we refer to this type of loss as a ‘back-
loading loss’. Although actuaries using the PUM to value aggregate pension lia-
bilities of a firm set asinglecontribution rate (as a proportion of earnings) for all
members whatever the age, the effective cost to the scheme of employing older
members is higher than that of younger members. This follows because an addi-
exclusions and deductions from earnings are made, then the portability loss rises to 46 % (his
‘Example 1’).
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Figure 4.5: Accrued early leaver pension as a proportion of the full service pension
for MFR worker ‘B’.
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Figure 4.6: Accrued early leaver pension as a proportion of the full service pension
for MFR worker ‘C’.
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tional year of service from an older worker buys a larger pension entitlement than
an additional year of service from a younger member. This occurs because pay
is almost invariably backloaded, being higher in real terms towards the end of a
career than at the start and also because greater service has already accrued for an
older worker than for a younger worker. The marginal effective contribution rate
riseswith age if the PUM is used.
We can compare the PUM (which is used by about 75% of UK pension schemes
to value their liabilities) with a ‘prospective benefit funding method’ such as the
‘attained age method’ (AAM). This method sets the contribution rate taking into
account future salaries and service and hence, if expectations about these are re-
alized, arrives at a constant, age-independentmarginalcontribution rate. We can
determine the constant contribution rate (c) needed to generate the same pension
in retirement as given by the PUM by setting:14
c =
PPUM(t0; tN)PtN
s=t0
W (s)(1 + r)tN s
: (4.6)
Eq. (4.6) shows that the constant contribution rate using the AAM is given by the
ratio of the full service pension at retirement age (using the PUM) to the com-
pound value of lifetime earnings. So long as the interest rate () in Eq. (4.6)
is the same as the realized yield on pension fund assets (as will be the case if
the MFR norms are satisfied), there will exist an ‘equivalent’ defined contribution
pension scheme that will also generate the same pension in retirement if the an-
nual contribution rate into this scheme is also set atc.15 The accrued value of the
pension benefits in the defined benefit scheme using the AAM (PAAM ) or in the
‘equivalent’ defined contribution scheme (PDC) is given by:
PAAM(t0; t)  PDC(t0; t) = c
tX
s=t0
W (s)(1 + r)t s (4.7)
With the MFR norms satisfied, the standard contribution rate is12:2%.16 Fig.
(4.7) compares the constant contribution rate with the upward sloping contribution
14This formula follows from equating the value of the attained age pension fund with that of the
PUM fund at the retirement dateN .
15By definition, the defined contribution scheme cannot build up surpluses or deficits. However,
if the realized yield on the portfolio of assets differs fromr, then a surplus or deficit will build up
in a defined benefit scheme, and under the AAM (or other similar prospective benefit methods) the
contribution rate will be adjusted to eliminate the surplus or deficit.
16This contribution rate depends on the choices of annuity factor and accrual rates. However,
schemes which provide spouse’s benefit and discretionary benefits will have higher contribution
rates to compensate for these additional benefits.
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Figure 4.7: Implicit marginal contribution rates using the PUM and AAM.
rate implicit in the PUM. With the PUM, the effective contribution rate is initially
much lower than the AAM contribution rate, equals it in mid-career and is more
than double the constant contribution rate at retirement. The slope of the upward
sloping contribution rate flattens out slightly at retirement as the discount rate is
lowered on a 10 year sliding scale from equity yields to gilt yields. This factor is
already taken into account in determining the constant contribution rate.
Fig. (4.8) shows how pension benefits accrue over a scheme member’s career
using the backloaded (PUM) and non-backloaded (AAM) valuation methods. We
can calculate theadditionalloss to the cash equivalent as a result of the backload-
ing of pay and contributions.17 Fig. (4.9) reveals that theabsolutebackloading
17The use of the term ‘loss’ here is not meant to imply that the AAM is the ‘best’ valuation
method. The term ‘loss’ is intended to mean what is lost by switching to a scheme with a constant
contribution rate, such as most defined contribution schemes. It may be that the optimal defined
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Figure 4.8: Accumulated values of backloaded and non-backloaded pensions.
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Figure 4.9: Difference between backloaded and non-backloaded pension benefits.
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Figure 4.10: Relative backloading loss as a proportion of the non-backloaded
pension benefit.
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loss is inverse U-shaped, reaching a maximum for someone who leaves a scheme
in their 50s; indeed, the shape of the backloading loss as a function of the age of
the early leaver is similar to that of the absolute cash equivalent loss, although the
magnitude is lower (c.f., Fig. (4.2)). In Fig. (4.10) we plot therelativebackload-
ing loss which is similar to the case of the cash equivalent loss (c.f., Fig. (4.3)) in
that it is decreasing with the age of the early leaver.
To illustrate the potential implications of the backloading of pay on portability
loss, we return to the case of MFR worker ‘C’. We recall that this worker entered
the labour market and stayed at a single job for twenty years and was made re-
dundant at age45. In the previous section, s/he received13:46 years’ credit for
his/her20 years of service when changing jobs. However, suppose that the new
scheme that this worker transfers into is identical to the first scheme in terms of
the expected full service pension it provides, except that it does so on the basis of
a constant contribution rate for all members whatever their age.
In Fig. (4.11), we show that worker ‘C’ faces an additional portability loss
if the new employer operates a defined contribution pension scheme (or another
defined benefit scheme with a constant marginal contribution rate). The worker
is left with only 70:7% of the full service pension at retirement rather than84%.
His/her job loss at age 45 costs him/her in two separate ways. The first cost is
the black area which represents the effect of the loss of added years on his/her
transfer value. The second cost is the hatched area which represents the loss due
to the backloading of pay. Thus, when the worker transfers to an ‘equivalent’
defined contribution scheme at the new firm with its flat contribution structure,
s/he is worse off. This happenseven ifthe same amount of contributions are paid
into both schemes from his/her salary: the explanation for this lies in the rate of
accrual of pension benefits, not in the level of contributions.
Fig. (4.11) assumesno charges. Charges can be very high in personal pension
schemes. To illustrate the effect of charges, we consider instead the case where
the worker switches into a personal pension scheme which makes an initial charge
of 25% on any incoming lump sum and thereafter charges2:5% on any subsequent
premia paid.18 In this case, as shown in Fig. (4.12), the worker suffers an addi-
tional portability loss, so that at age45 s/he will only have half the accrued pension
benefits to which s/he would be entitled if s/he had stayed in the original job and
pension scheme. Even if his/her employer contributes fully at the same rate as
in the original scheme, s/he only receives61:3% of the full service pension.19 In
contribution pension scheme has a stepped contribution structure. Nevertheless, workers who
switch from defined benefit schemes into defined contribution schemes will ordinarily encounter
constant contribution rates and hence experience this loss.
18This cost structure is typical of UK personal pension schemes (c.f., (Blake 1995), sec. 7.3.4).
19A portability loss of a similar size was reported by (Davies 1990) (c.f., his ‘Example 1’) under
similar conditions.
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the UK, most employers do not contribute to personal pension schemes. If the
employer does not contribute, then the worker would end up with only37:1% of
the full service pension.20
Fig. (4.11) therefore illustrates the consequences of the mis-selling of per-
sonal pension schemes in the UK during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Older
workers were persuaded to transfer from a defined benefit scheme into a personal
pension scheme. They suffered in five different ways: they experienced (1) a cash
equivalent loss, (2) a backloading loss, (3) high initial charges, (4) high annual
charges, and (5) the loss of employer contributions.
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Figure 4.11: Accrued early leaver pension as a proportion of the full service pen-
sion for MFR worker ‘C’. The black area is the cash equivalent loss, while the
hatched area is the backloading loss.
20We are assuming that the employee contribution rate is half the employer contribution rate
((Government Actuary’s Department 1994), Table 6.1). We ignore the SERPS rebate.
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Figure 4.12: Accrued early leaver pension as a proportion of the full service pen-
sion for MFR worker ‘C’, switching at age 45 into various alternative types of
scheme.
The backloaded structure of contributions and pension benefit accrual implicit
in defined benefit schemes is not a direct issue in the mechanical calculation of
transfer values and added years of service, but it has major implications for the
welfare of individuals who may have no choice but to switch to money purchase
schemes with their new employers. Furthermore, employers who realize the pen-
sion costs associated with providing defined benefit pensions to an ageing work-
force may either switch to defined contribution schemes or show more hesitation
in employing older workers.21
21Both these features have been observed in the U.K. over the last decade.
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4.3 Summary
In this chapter, we have identified two sources of portability loss:
 a cash equivalent lossin which the worker switching jobs suffers a porta-
bility loss in the value of his/her accrued pension benefits because future
real wage growth is disregarded.
 abackloading lossin which the worker switching jobs may suffer an addi-
tional portability loss because contributions are backloaded in one scheme
but not in another.
We have shown that early leavers would experience one or both of these losses,
even if the actuary’s forecasts about price inflation and returns on investments
were fully realized. The average worker in the UK is likely to change jobs at least
five times during his/her career, with most of the changes taking place early in
the working life. We considered the costs for changing jobs in a stylized world in
which the MFR norms were satisfied. In the case where a worker changed jobs
seven times, his/her final pension was71% of the full service pension; in the case
of five changes, it was75%; even with just one change in mid-career, the final pen-
sion was only84% of the full service pension. In the last case, if the worker had
switched into an ‘equivalent’ defined contribution scheme (with constant contri-
butions), s/he would have ended up with71% of the full service pension, because
she had lost the benefit of contributions backloading in the first scheme. If, in-
stead, the worker had switched into a personal pension scheme, the high charges
incurred with such schemes would have reduced the fund pension to either61%
or 37% of the full service pension, depending on whether the new employer did or
did not contribute to the scheme. These are extraordinary potential penalties for
just a single job change in a worker’s life.
Chapter 5
Estimating Portability Losses for
Different Types of Workers in the
U.K.
So far, we have assumed that the actuary’s assumptions have been realized in
full. In this case, early leavers will be indifferent as to whether they take transfer
values or leave deferred pensions, since they will end up with identical pensions.
However, it is likely that the actual outcomes for wage growth, inflation and yields
on assets over a member’s lifetime in a pension scheme will differ widely from
the actuary’s assumptions. It therefore follows that one of the options, the transfer
value, the deferred pension, or even a switch into a personal pension scheme,
will turn out to be better than the others at the time of retirement; however, it is
impossible to know what the best choice will be with certainty when it has to be
made.However, the option most likely to offer the largest pension in retirement
for most British workers is the deferred pension.This is because of two factors:
the shape of the lifetime earnings profiles of the majority of British employees and
the high charges associated with personal pension schemes.
We showed in the last chapter that the portability loss on transfer values de-
pends only on the separation ages and the actuary’s assumptions concerning future
real wage growth. An actuary performing MFR calculations is required to assume
aconstantrate of growth of real wages of about2% p.a. While this is a reasonable
assumption when aggregating across all workers, it does not reflect the reality of
most workers’ earnings profiles over their lifetimes. This is because a constant
growth rate in real wages implies aconvexlifetime earnings profile, whereas the
experience of most workers is to have aconcavelifetime earnings profile, with
real growth rates in earnings higher than average in early life and lower than av-
erage in later life. Even if the growth rate in wages is higher than the2% average
in just one year, this implies that it will be lower than average in each of the other
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years (on average). This suggests that for most years, actuaries will predict higher
real wage growth rates than will turn out to be realized subsequently and hence
credit a smaller number of added years on an incoming transfer than warranted
by subsequent experience. In other words, the transfer value will on average turn
out to involve a greater portability loss than the deferred pension for most work-
ers. We can illustrate this using lifetime earnings profiles for ‘average’ workers
generated from data contained in the New Earnings Survey (Office of National
Statistics 1996) and also from a study of ‘typical’ men and women over their life
cycle developed from labour market survey data (Joshi, Davies, and Land 1996).
5.1 Average UK Wage Profiles
To examine potential portability losses faced by average UK workers, we con-
structed lifetime earnings profiles from the 1996 New Earnings Survey for man-
ual and non-manual workers.1 We continue to assume that MFR asset market and
inflation assumptions are realized.
An Average Manual Worker
In Fig. (5.1), we show the earnings profile of the average UK manual worker
in terms of the real wage a 20 year old worker today can expect to earn when s/he
reaches a given age. In Fig. (5.2), we show the accrued pension benefits of the
manual worker in a defined benefit scheme (calculated using the projected unit
method) as well as the cash equivalent (transfer value) should s/he leave the job
at a given age (calculated using the current unit revalued method) and the value
of a constant contribution pension designed to deliver an equivalent pension at
retirement.2 The difference between the constant contribution and the ongoing
pension benefit curves is the backloading loss. The difference between the on-
going pension benefit and the cash equivalent curves shows the cash equivalent
1The New Earnings Survey reports wages for workers in various age brackets. We used cubic
spline interpolation to construct wages as a function of age, producing estimates of wages at each
age. Cross-sectional wage data shows that wages are lower for older workers than middle-aged
workers; however, a worker aged 50 today will not necessarily be earning a lower wage when he
retires. The reason for this is that the static profile needs to be uprated for real economic growth.
To make this correction, we used the age distribution of the labour force from the Labour Force
Survey((Office of National Statistics 1997), pp. 62-63) to compute the average growth rate implicit
in the static interpolated profile, computed from ages 25-65 (by summing over all the age-specific
growth rates implicit in the static profile weighted by the age distribution of the labour force). This
growth rate (which arises from career progression) is less than the historical real growth rate and
we attribute the difference to real economic growth, scaling up the wage profile by the difference
between observed real wage growth and the implicit growth rate from the static profile. This then
produces a wage profile with implicit wage growth equal to the historical average.
2This is calculated using the attained age method with realized wages.
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Figure 5.1: The lifetime earnings profile of the average UK manual worker
loss.
In Fig. (5.3), we show the actuarial value of the cash equivalent loss for the av-
erage manual worker when s/he leaves a job at a given age; it depends on whether
s/he chooses to take a transfer value or leave a deferred pension. Since the actuary
using MFR norms forecasts a higher growth rate in earnings than will be real-
ized with the average UK manual worker, it will never be optimal for this average
worker to take a transfer value.
To get some idea of the size of typical portability losses, we suppose that the
worker only changes his/her job once at age45, after20 years of service. S/he
will receive a transfer value of approximately$32; 664 or about 1.7 times his/her
wage. Just before the worker lost the job, the actuary using MFR norms would
have valued his/her pension benefits on an ongoing basis at$48; 537. In this case,
there is no direct backloading of pay because the invested value of the employer
and employee contributions would have been$48; 361 (assuming a constant con-
tribution rate over the lifetime and an equity yield equal to the MFR norm). Nev-
ertheless, the worker still ends up with a loss at retirement as the final pension is
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Figure 5.2: The accrued pension benefits of the average UK manual worker.
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Figure 5.3: Transfer value and deferred pension losses for the average manual
worker.
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only 78% of the full service pension which is less than the83:6% which would
have been received if the new scheme was a defined benefit scheme. The first loss
is incurred if the employee switches to another equivalent defined benefit scheme.
The second loss is an additional loss that would arise in the case where the new
employer operates an ‘equivalent’ defined contribution scheme.
Assuming that his/her new job and pension scheme have similar characteris-
tics, the worker will be offered a transfer value of13:46 years, whereas if s/he
accepted a deferred pension s/he would have received the equivalent of roughly
18:3 years. The net result is that, if s/he accepted the transfer value, his/her final
pension (assuming 20 years’ service is earned in the next scheme) is approxi-
mately84% of the full service pension whereas if s/he took a deferred pension,
it would be worth about96% of the full service pension. The reason for this is
that the MFR assumptions overstate his/her anticipated wage growth in middle
age and as a result the number of years credited is only74% of the number that
should have been credited if the subsequent salary experience of this worker had
been known to the actuary.
Suppose instead that the new scheme is an ‘equivalent’ defined contribution
scheme with a constant contribution rate set according to Eq. (4.6) to give the
same pension at retirement. The average manual worker will still be worse off
than the typical MFR worker considered in the last chapter because his/her wage
growth has slowed down in later life. At the end of his/her career, the worker
has a pension of only78% of the full service pension in the original scheme,
even though we are assuming the worker has the same final salary in both cases.
As an alternative, if the worker takes out a personal pension at age 45with the
same contributionsas the defined contribution scheme we have just considered,
commission charges reduce the size of his/her pension to about66% of the full
service pension in the original scheme. The single event of switching in mid-
career into a personal pension scheme has cost this worker about one-third of
Separation Age Years Worked Years Transferred Implied Deferred Years
28 3 1.44 2.08
29 1 0.0 0.0
30 1 0.0 0.0
40 10 6.10 8.81
57 17 14.51 16.33
65 8 8.0 8.0
TOTAL 40 30.05 35.22
Table 5.1: Service accrual for an average UK manual worker under separation
assumptions ‘A’.
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Figure 5.4: Accrued early leaver pension as a proportion of the full service pension
for an average manual worker with the same job tenure patterns as MFR worker
‘A’. The black area is the portability loss from leaving deferred pensions, while
the hatched area is theadditionalportability loss from taking transfer values.
his/her retirement pension.
We now consider what happens to the average manual worker who changes
jobs several times during his/her career with the same job tenure patterns as MFR
worker ‘A’ (see Table (5.1)). Figure (5.4) shows pension portability losses for an
average UK manual worker who switches jobs five times. The black area is the
portability loss if the worker always leaves deferred pensions. The hatched area is
theadditionalportability loss if the worker applies his/her transfer values to pur-
chasing service credits in the next scheme. If the worker leaves deferred pensions,
s/he receives88% of the full service pension, compared with the75% received by
the worker who accepts transfer values. This follows from the concavity of the
worker’s lifetime earnings profile.
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Figure 5.5: The lifetime earnings profile of the average UK non-manual worker
An Average Non-Manual Worker
We now consider the case of the average UK non-manual worker. Fig (5.5)
shows the wage of the average UK non-manual worker. It is worthy of note that the
real wage at retirement is actually slightlylower than the real wage a few years
before retirement. In Fig. (5.6), we plot the accrued pension benefits for this
worker. We observe that, because the real wage falls as retirement approaches,
the constant contribution pension benefit curve dips below the ongoing pension
benefit curves, although it always remains above the cash equivalent curve. In Fig.
(5.7), we plot the portability losses/gains for this worker. At age 58, the worker’s
real wage exceeds his/her subsequent retirement wage, so that by quitting shortly
after this age, the worker has a small portability gain if s/he leaves a deferred
pension. However, the transfer value losses are always positive and are shown by
the solid line.
To illustrate the portability loss in cash terms, suppose again that the worker
only changes employment once at age45, after 20 years of service. S/he will
receive a transfer value equal to 13.46 years’ service or$49; 430 or 1:7 times of
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Figure 5.6: The accrued pension benefits of the average UK non-manual worker.
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Figure 5.7: Transfer value and deferred pension losses for the average non-manual
worker.
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his/her annual wage. In contrast, the total accumulated value of employer and
employee contributions (assuming a constant contribution rate with contributions
invested at the equity yield) would be$72; 696, whereas the actuary values the
employee’s ongoing pension benefits at$73; 451.
Assuming that the new job and pension scheme have similar characteristics,
s/he will be offered a transfer value13:46 years, whereas if s/he had left behind
a deferred pension, s/he would have received the equivalent of17:45 years. The
net result is that, with the transfer value, his/her final pension is worth only84%
of the full service pension, whereas the deferred pension is worth93:6% of the
full service pension. The reason for this is that the MFR norms again overstate
the anticipated wage growth in middle age and, as a result, the number of years
credited is only70:3% of the number that would be credited if the subsequent
wage history of the worker was known to the actuary.
Fig. (5.8) shows what happens if the non-manual worker switches either into
an ‘equivalent’ defined contribution scheme or into a personal pensions scheme
where the employers also contributes. In the case of an equivalent defined con-
tribution scheme, the pension is79% of the full service pension, whereas if the
cash equivalent was put into an approved personal pension scheme with the same
employer contribution, the pension would be worth68% of the full service pen-
sion. Without employer contributions, the pension would be worth44% of the full
service pension.
Summary
In this subsection, we have used data from the New Earnings Survey to analyze
the portability losses faced by average UK workers. The results are qualitatively
quite similar to those found for the typical MFR workers in the previous chapter
except that, because of theshapeof the wage profile of average U.K. workers,
transfer values may not be actuarially fair for older workers and they would be
better off leaving deferred pensions in their former schemes. Because older work-
ers tend to have smaller wage growth late in their careers relative to the MFR
assumptions, they will be hurt even more than the MFR workers by switching to
a firm with a money purchase scheme that was designed to be equally generous
(but only under the condition that an individual remained in the scheme for his/her
whole career).
5.2 Some Typical U.K. Wage Profiles
In this section, we examine pensions portability losses using some ‘typical’ UK
workers. The lifetime earnings profiles of these typical workers were constructed
by Heather Joshi, Hugh Davies and Hilary Land (Joshi, Davies, and Land 1996)
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Figure 5.8: Accrued early leaver pension as a proportion of the full service pension
for the average non-manual worker, switching at age 45 into various alternative
types of pension schemes.
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to fit the employment patterns in various employment datasets such as the 1980
Women and Employment Survey. We consider the following typical (rather than
average) individuals:
 Mr. High, a typical high-earning male.
 Ms. High, a typical high-earning female with no children.
 Mr. Low, a typical low-earning male.
who were used in (Joshi, Davies, and Land 1996) (Joshi and Davies 1994) to
analyze various features of the state pension scheme.3 Th se studies provide many
other typical earnings profiles, especially of married low-income women, but such
cases are not relevant for the analysis of occupational pension portability issues in
the U.K. since such people are unlikely even to participate in these schemes; they
are either part-time workers or spend many years out of the labour force raising
children. Although part-time workers now have the same pension rights as full-
time workers, the transfer values of such workers (in defined benefit schemes) are
so poor that these rights are worth little in practice.
Mr. High
The wage profile of Mr. High, a typical high-earning man, is shown in Fig.
(5.9). We assume that Mr. High has no pension before age 25 and then consider in
Table (5.2) the case where he changes job several times over his career (according
to job-leaving assumptions ‘A’). If Mr. High always leaves deferred pensions, he
receives79:7% of the full service pension, whereas if he accepts transfer values
he receives75:1%. On the other hand, if we use job-leaving assumptions ‘B’, Mr.
High receives76:4% of his full service pension if he takes a deferred pension and
71:5% if he always accepts transfer values (see Table 5.3).
As an alternative example, we consider the case in which Mr. High changes
jobs only once in his career, at age45. If he accepts a transfer value, he will
receive at retirement83:6% of the full service pension. This is because his real
wage appreciates less quickly than the actuary predicts between the ages of45
and65. In comparison, he receives88:4% of the full service pension if he accepts
a deferred pension. In this case, a transfer value calculated according to MFR
norms is94:6% of the value of the deferred pension. If the new scheme ran a
defined contribution plan, he would receive a final pension of only74:4% of the
full service pension, while if he put his transfer value into a personal pension with
the same charges as above the final pension would be63:9% of final salary. These
results are shown in Fig. (5.10).
3For more details on the construction of these earnings profiles, see also (Davies and Joshi
1992). The wage profiles used in this study take into account historical real wage growth.
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Figure 5.9: The lifetime earnings profile of Mr. High, a typical high-earning man.
Separation Age Years Worked Years Transferred Implied Deferred Years
28 3 1.44 1.55
29 1 0.00 0.00
29 1 0.00 0.00
40 10 6.10 7.03
57 17 14.51 15.32
65 8 8.0 8
TOTAL 40 30.05 31.89
Table 5.2: Service accrual for Mr. High under separation assumptions ‘A’.
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Separation Age Years Worked Years Transferred Implied Deferred Years
26 1 0.0 0.0
27 1 0.0 0.0
30 3 1.50 1.65
31 1 0.0 0.0
38 7 4.10 4.71
44 6 3.95 4.54
55 11 9.02 9.66
65 10 10 10.0
TOTAL 40 28.58 30.55
Table 5.3: Service accrual for Mr. High under separation assumptions ‘B’.
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Figure 5.10: Accrued early leaver pension as a proportion of the full service pen-
sion for Mr. High who switches at age45 into various alternative types of scheme.
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Figure 5.11: The lifetime earnings profile of Ms. High, a typical high-earning
woman with no children.
Ms. High with No Children
The lifetime earnings profile of Ms. High, a typical high-earning woman who
works full-time throughout her career, is shown in Fig. (5.11). We assume that
Ms. High has no pension before age 25 and then consider in Table (5.4) the case
where she changes job several times over her career (according to job-leaving as-
sumptions ‘A’). If Ms. High always leaves deferred pensions, she receives85:3%
of the full service pension, whereas if she accepts transfer values she receives
75:1%. On the other hand, if we use job-leaving assumptions ‘B’, Ms. High
receives82:4% of her full service pension if she leaves a deferred pension and
71:5% if she always accepts transfer values (see Table (5.5)).
Suppose instead that Ms. High changed her job only once in her career, at age
45. If she accepts a transfer value, she will receive at retirement83:6% of the full
service pension. On the other hand, because her real wage does not appreciate
as much as that of Mr. High, she would be relatively better off with a deferred
pension with the equivalent of17:69 years of service instead of the13:46 she is
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Separation Age Years Worked Years Transferred Implied Deferred Years
28 3 1.44 1.70
29 1 0.00 0.00
29 1 0.00 0.00
40 10 6.10 8.20
57 17 14.51 16.22
65 8 8.0 8
TOTAL 40 30.05 34.13
Table 5.4: Service accrual for Ms. High with no children under separation as-
sumptions ‘A’.
Separation Age Years Worked Years Transferred Implied Deferred Years
26 1 0.0 0.0
27 1 0.0 0.0
30 3 1.50 1.85
31 1 0.0 0.0
38 7 4.10 5.50
44 6 3.95 5.25
55 11 9.02 10.38
65 10 10 10.0
TOTAL 40 28.58 32.97
Table 5.5: Service accrual for Ms. High with no children under separation as-
sumptions ‘B’.
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Figure 5.12: The lifetime earnings profile of Mr. Low, a typical low-earning man.
offered with a transfer value. In this case, a transfer value calculated according
to MFR norms is only three-quarters of the value of the deferred pension. If her
new scheme operated on a defined contribution basis, she would receive a final
pension of79% of the full service pension, a slightly higher percentage than that
accruing to Mr. High with a steeper earnings profile. The transfer value she is paid
is$43; 731, while the actuary values her ongoing pension benefits at$64; 982.
Mr. Low
The wage profile of Mr. Low is shown in Fig.(5.12). In Table (5.6), we show
the loss Mr. Low incurs if he switches jobs using the same pattern as MFR worker
‘A’. If Mr. Low always accepts transfer values calculated according to MFR as-
sumptions, he receives75:1% of the full service pension at retirement, whereas if
he leaves a deferred pension, he receives77:7% of the full service pension. The
portability losses of Mr. Low under the job separation patterns of MFR worker
‘B’ are shown in Table (5.7) and Fig. (5.14).
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Separation Age Years Worked Years Transferred Implied Deferred Years
28 3 1.44 1.49
29 1 0.00 0.00
29 1 0.00 0.00
40 10 6.09 6.66
57 17 14.51 14.94
65 8 8.0 8
TOTAL 40 30.05 31.09
Table 5.6: Service accrual for Mr. Low under separation assumptions ‘A’.
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Figure 5.13: Accrued early leaver pension as a proportion of the full service pen-
sion for Mr. Low with the same job tenure patterns as MFR typical worker ’A’.
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Separation Age Years Worked Years Transferred Implied Deferred Years
26 1 0.0 0.0
27 1 0.0 0.0
30 3 1.50 1.58
31 1 0.0 0.0
38 7 4.10 4.48
44 6 3.95 4.27
55 11 9.02 9.36
65 10 10 10.0
TOTAL 40 28.58 29.70
Table 5.7: Service accrual for Mr. Low under separation assumptions ‘B’.
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Figure 5.14: Accrued early leaver pension as a proportion of the full service pen-
sion for Mr. Low with the same job tenure patterns as MFR worker ‘A’.
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Even if Mr. Low changed jobs only once at age 45, he would receive ser-
vice credits in the new scheme worth13:46 years, whereas based on final salary,
the deferred pension is worth14:48 years. The total transfer value paid out is
$41; 902, whereas the actuary valued the worker’s pension benefit prior to leav-
ing at$62; 265. Before the 1995 Pensions Act, the worker would have received
$47; 985 as a transfer value since gilt rather than equity yields were used for dis-
counting then. Again, there are substantial portability losses if the new scheme of
the worker is a defined contribution scheme (because of the backloading of pay);
the value of accumulated contributions to a constant contribution scheme intended
to lead to the same level of retirement income is$73; 665. The full service retire-
ment pension has a present value at retirement of$281; 940, while the pension
based on the transfer value credited for added years is worth$235; 839 and the
deferred pension is worth$243; 043. On the other hand, if Mr. Low switched
schemes to an ‘equivalent’ defined contribution fund, at retirement his pension
would be worth only$213; 330 or 73% of the full service final salary pension.
5.3 Summary
In this chapter, we have illustrated how the portability losses affect different types
of UK workers. The results are summarized in Table (5.8). Under reasonable
assumptions, early leavers can end up with the following percentages of a full
service pension, depending on what they choose to do with the cash equivalent:
74% - 86% for those leaving deferred pensions,71% - 75% for those taking trans-
fer values,73% - 79% for those switching into ‘equivalent’ defined contribution
schemes,63% - 68% for those going for a personal pension scheme into which
the employer also contributes, and39% - 45% for those joining a personal pen-
sion scheme where the employer does not contribute.
One surprising result is the relative gain from keeping deferred pensions in-
stead of accepting transfer values. The reason for this is that, although the average
real growth rate of wages in the UK is approximately the same as the MFR norm,
the MFR norms assume that annual salaries grow exponentially with age. This
has the striking implication that it is, on average, not optimal for workers to take
transfer values; instead, they should ordinarily leave behind a deferred pension
every time they switch pension schemes. The explanation for this lies in the front-
loading of earnings growth rates which leads actuaries using MFR norms to over-
estimate future earnings, thereby biasing downwards service credits received in
the new scheme. Those who lose the most from accepting a transfer value relative
to a deferred pension are the middle-aged workers who most need a protection
against portability loss. This is a powerful argument against the MFR assumption
of constant growth rates in wages over the lifetime and an argument for actuar-
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Worker Type Transfer Deferred Defined Personal Pension Personal
Value Pension Contribution (Employer Contributes) Pension
MFR A 75% 75%
B 71% 71%
C 84 % 84% 71 % 61 % 37 %
Average Manual A 75% 88%
B 71% 86%
C 84% 96% 78 % 66 % 45 %
Average Non-Manual A 75 % 86 %
B 71% 83%
C 84% 94% 79% 68% 44%
Mr. High A 75% 80%
B 71% 76%
C 84% 88% 74% 64 % 40 %
Ms. High A 75% 85%
B 71% 82%
C 84% 94% 79% 67% 44 %
Mr. Low A 75% 78%
B 71% 74%
C 84% 86% 73% 63% 39%
Job separation assumptions:
A: separates at ages 28,29,30,40, and 57.
B: separates at ages 26,27,30,31,38,44, and 55.
C: separates at age 45
Table 5.8: Summary of portability losses (percentage of full service pension received at retirement)
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ial discretion or at least more suitable rules. The next chapter reviews actuarial
discretion in detail.
Chapter 6
Actuarial Discretion
Recommendation 74 of the Pension Law Review Committee chaired by Professor
Goode was that: “The actuarial profession should be charged with responsibility
for tightening the bases under its Guidance Note: Retirement Benefit Schemes
- Transfer Values (GN11) so that the possible range of transfer values becomes
much narrower than at present” ((Goode 1993), p. 25). In particular, the Goode
report states in sec. 4.7.29: “If the scheme is fully funded, transfer values should
be calculated on a basis which is no less favourable to the departing member than
that used in assessing the minimum solvency of the scheme.”
In reviewing the new version of GN11 which was drawn up in response to the
Goode Report and the 1995 Pensions Act, we find that actuarial calculations are
still subject to a wide range of discretion and that there is no guarantee that the ba-
sis used will not be less favourable than the MFR basis (as described in Guidance
Note 27 and listed in Appendix A below). Actuaries are permitted to calculate
the whole amount of the cash equivalent using the MFR basis. However, if they
choose not to do this, they must still calculate the Minimum Cash Equivalent (the
minimum a scheme must provide to each of its members in order to contract out
of SERPS after 6 April 1997) using the MFR basis, although some variation is
permitted. The new GN 11 states (sec. 4.9):
In most cases the modification of the GN27 assumptions, as set out in this
section, to take account of individual circumstances should not produce an
aggregate result of the minimum cash equivalents for the whole scheme
greatly different from the MFR. However, if the assumptions used combined
with any unusual features of the scheme produce a significant bias, which
results in this relationship no longer remaining valid, the actuary should in-
form the trustees of this and advise them of any implications.
This means that, in aggregate, if the assumptions the actuary uses to calculate
the Minimum Cash Equivalent should differ from the MFR basis, s/he is obliged to
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inform the trustees. But there is no guarantee thatany individualcash equivalent
will be close to that which would be obtained using MFR assumptions.
For any excess above the Minimum Cash Equivalent, considerably more dis-
cretion is permitted. The significance of this is that for schemes contracted out
of SERPS, the Minimum Cash Equivalent portion of transfer values is subject to
less discretion than the remainder of the pension, but even the calculation of the
Minimum Cash Equivalent foreach workeris subject to actuarial discretion.
Calculations of outgoing transfer values are subject to the following key ele-
ments of actuarial discretion:1
 The choice of discount factor in computing present values.
 The choice of inflation rate in revaluing projected wages.
 The choice of annuity factor. GN27 (D.1) suggests the PA90 mortality ta-
bles downrated two years, at least for smaller schemes (less than$100 mil-
lion of pension liabilities). However, GN11 does not place any constraints
on the actuary outside of Minimum Cash Equivalent calculations and, even
in this case, GN11 allows the actuary to vary the morality assumptions, e.g.
they are permitted to use unisex mortality factors.2. In cases where a pen-
sion would be payable only to the current spouse, the spouse’s age may be
used (GN11, 4.5) and this may affect the annuity factor.
 Marital status. MFR norms specify proportions married but the actuary in
Minimum Cash Equivalent calculations can make use of the actual marital
status of the spouse.
 Discretionary benefits. Both the old and new versions of GN11 allow for
variations due to additional discretionary benefits. Discretionary benefits
may be franked against the Minimum Cash Equivalent (which does not take
into account discretionary benefits).
 If some accrued service arises from an earlier transfer value, GN11 allows
modifications to be made in the calculations in certain circumstances (Sec.
5.2, 5.3).
 For non-Minimum Cash Equivalent transfers (both inward and outward),
allowance may be made for expenses (GN11, 3.6), although there is no
1In practice, most transfer values are not calculated on an individual basis by an actuary. The
most common procedure is for actuaries to lay down a set of factors or formulae (often presented
in the form of easy to read tables) which scheme administrators use to calculate transfer values.
2According to the Government Actuary’s Department, the majority of UK schemes use unisex
mortality factors.
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indication of the permissible size of these (however, the expenses allowed
by GN27 for winding down a scheme are4% for the first$50 million in
liabilities).
 If the pension scheme is in actuarial deficit or a payment out would create
a problem for the security of benefits, transfer payments can be reduced or
delayed.
 Sec. 3.2 of GN11 allows the actuary discretion in making adjustments to the
value of the transfer payment to cover any implicit options (about retirement
date, etc.) in the pension scheme. This, however, is an improvement over
the previous GN11 which did not discuss options and option values.
 Application of market value adjustments (MVAs). For Minimum Cash
Equivalent calculations, the actuary calculates MVAs based on market con-
ditions on preset dates, no less frequently than one month apart; typically
the MVAs are calculated on the same day each month and all calculations
during the month are based on these MVAs. For amounts above the Mini-
mum Cash Equivalent, the actuary has full discretion over any market value
adjustments. MVAs are relatively complex and a full analysis is left to Ap-
pendix D.
Computation of inward transfers involves all the above elements of discretion
plus:
 The choice of projected increases in real wages.
To assess the effect of actuarial discretion, we have where possible computed
the percentage changes in both outgoing transfer values (valued using Eq. (4.2))
and incoming service credits (i.e., added years) with respect to changes in discre-
tionary parameters and evaluated these changes at the MFR norms. For example,
suppose we wish to consider how transfer values change when the discount rate
assumptionr changes by a small amount, then we compute the elasticity of trans-
fer value with respect to the discount rate:
r =
@PCUM (t0; t)
@r
r
PCUM
(6.1)
and evaluate the other parameters in this expression at the MFR norms.3
3The elasticities for outgoing transfers are:
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Actuarial
Parameter
Years to Retirement
40 30 20 10
Inflation 1.54 1.15 0.77 0.38
Discount Rate -3.30 -2.48 -1.65 -0.83
Annuity Factor 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Table 6.1: Elasticities of the outgoing transfer value with respect to actuarial dis-
cretion.
Actuarial
Parameter
Years to Retirement
40 30 20 10
Real Wage Growth -0.78 -0.59 -0.39 -0.20
Inflation 1.54 1.15 0.77 0.38
Discount Rate 3.30 2.48 1.65 0.83
Annuity Factor -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00
Table 6.2: Elasticities of incoming service credits with respect to actuarial discre-
tion.
The effect of actuarial discretion depends naturally on the age of the worker as
well as the years of service. The elasticities are summarized in Table (6.1). Table
 =  (t  tN )

1 + 
r = (t  tN )
r
1 + r
A = 1:0
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(6.2) presents similar similar elasticities with respect to incoming service credits.4
These tables show that the discount rate, annuity factor, inflation rate and wage
growth rate assumptions are crucial in actuarial calculations. Thus, different ac-
tuaries making different assumptions about these values can produce dramatically
different calculations for outgoing transfer values and added years of service. For
example, if the actuary for the leaving scheme deviates by11% from the MFR
norms so that, for example, s/he uses a discount factor of10% instead of the MFR
basis of9% for a worker aged 35 with 30 years to retirement, Table (6.1) indi-
cates that the transfer value the worker receives will be reduced by about27:5%.
If the actuary for the receiving scheme then uses a real wage growth assumption
of 3:0% instead of the MFR assumption of2:0%, Table (6.2) suggests that the
worker’s years of service credited will be reduced by29:5%. With just these two
variations in actuarial assumptions (and assuming the actual real wage growth
rate is the MFR norm of2:0%), the pension the worker receives at retirement is
only about57% of the pension that would have been received had the actuaries
not made these variations. We emphasize that these losses from unfavourable ac-
tuarial variations from the MFR norms arein addition to the portability losses
analyzed in Chapter 4 above. Having demonstrated the significance of actuarial
discretion, we proceed to analyze specific factors involved in actuarial discretion
in more detail.
6.1 Discount Factor
The old version of GN11 stated in sec. 3.2:
4The elasticities for years of service credited are:
g = (t  tN )
g
1 + g
 = (t  tN)

1 + 
r =   (t  tN )
r
1 + r
A =  1:0
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... actuarial value should be assessed having regard to market rates of in-
terest. One of the ways in which a market value assessment may be made
is on the basis of market redemption yields on British Government Stocks
of appropriate duration and type at the time of transfer with allowance for
investment of future interest receipts at such rates as the actuary considers
reasonable. In valuing benefits which are subject to revaluation in accor-
dance with the general index of retail prices, yields on index-linked gilts
will be an appropriate criterion.
When the yield is higher, the discount factor used in computing transfer values
is higher and the transfer value is correspondingly lower. By using longer-term
bonds and thereby higher yielding bonds, transfer values are thus reduced more
for younger members. Transfer values would be reduced yet further if yields of
securities with even higher returns such as equities were used. GN11 now permits
the yields on these higher yielding securities to be used in computing transfer
values:
It is a fundamental requirement, stemming from legislation, that a cash
equivalent should represent the actuarial value of the benefits which would
have otherwise have been preserved. Such actuarial value should be as-
sessed having regard to the market rates of return on equities, gilts or other
such assets as the actuary considers appropriate...
The direct consequence of the new version of GN11 and the use of higher
discount factors is therefore the lowering of transfer values. The discount rate
enters the calculation of the transfer value in two ways: it affects the annuity factor
since a rise in the discount rate reduces the discounted value of future pension
payments, and it changes the rate at which the deferred pension is discounted to
the date on which the transfer value is paid.5 A rise in the discount rate reduces
both, but there is no requirement for actuaries to use the same discount rate in the
technical computation of the annuity factor. They can (and we do the same in the
following analysis) treat the annuity factor as constant.
The MFR norms for equity and gilt yields are9% (10% post-MFR retirement
age) and8% respectively. Although GN11 allows the actuary more discretion,
we will assume one discount rate for the period up to 10 years to retirement and
another one for the ten year period prior to retirement. The results as shown in
Table (6.3) are striking. Consider someone who is thirty years from retirement.
If the actuary uses the gilt discount rate (8%) for the whole period, the transfer
5While an actuary will normally apply a Market Value Adjustment (MVA) such as reviewed in
Appendix D, s/he has discretion over which assets are used in discounting; given the wide range
of available ‘market rates of return’, the actuary has enormous discretion over the discount rate.
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Years to Retirement Discount Rate #1 Discount Rate #2 Discount Factor
First Period Last Ten Years
40 12% 12% 0.01075
40 10% 8% 0.02654
40 9% 8% 0.0349
40 8% 8% 0.04603
30 12% 12% 0.03334
30 10% 8% 0.0689
30 9% 8% 0.0826
30 8% 8% 0.0994
20 10% 8% 0.179
20 9% 8% 0.196
20 8% 8% 0.2145
10 10% 8% 0.46319
Table 6.3: Dependence of the transfer value on actuarial assumptions.
value is20:2% higher than if the actuary had used the equity discount rate (9%)
and then switched to the gilt discount rate10 years to retirement.6
The 9% figure is a reasonable one to use in computing equity yields. It is
difficult to estimate accurately the mean growth rate of equities; however, the
average annual return on equities between 1955 and 1995 was about14% with
an annual standard deviation of about30% (Barclays de Zoete Wedd 1996). The
figure of14% however should be adjusted downwards to capture a risk adjustment
for holding equities and9% is not an unreasonable risk-adjusted figure. Similarly,
the average gilt yield between 1955 and 1995 of8:05% is very close to the MFR
assumption. Although the MFR assumptions concerning discount rates appear
reasonable, the actuary is left free by GN11 to choose alternative assumptions
which might as shown in Table (6.3) have significant effects on the discount rate
applied to the transfer value. For example, the discount factor 30 years from
retirement can differ by a factor of 3 under plausible assumptions concerning the
discount rate.7 However, it is unclear that the equity discount rate (instead of that
on indexed bonds) is the most appropriate one to use since deferred pensions also
contain an element of insurance over inflation.
6The ratio of discount factors is:

1:09
1:08
20
since the last ten years are discounted at the same
rate.
7The formula for the discount factor in this case:
(1 + Discount rate # 1) 20 (1 + Discount rate #2) 10.
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Years to Retirement Inflation Rate (%) Transfer Value as % of MFR Value
40 4.0 100 %
40 3.0 67.94 %
40 2.0 45.99 %
30 3.0 74.84 %
30 2.0 55.85 %
20 3.0 82.43 %
20 2.0 67.82 %
10 3.0 90.79 %
10 2.0 82.35 %
Table 6.4: Dependence of transfer value on inflation rate assumptions.
6.2 Inflation Revaluation Factor
The law requires that the deferred pension is uprated using LPI, i.e., the minimum
of the rate of inflation and5% p.a. compound. Hence, if the average rate of
inflation exceeds5% p.a. compound between the leaving and retirement dates,
the deferred pension is not fully indexed. Before the mid-1970s, there were no
indexing requirements and early leavers lost much of the value of their pension due
to high inflation. The historical average annual appreciation of the RPI in the U.K.
between 1955 and 1995 was6:74% but inflation appears to have slowed down in
the past decade. The MFR norm stated in GN27 is4% per annum. However, the
actuary is not required to use the MFR norm. Table (6.4) shows the dependence of
the transfer value on the actuarial assumption used.8 For example, if the actuary
decided to use an inflation rate of2% per annum instead of4% for a worker ten
years from retirement, the worker would immediately lose nearly18% of his/her
retirement income independent of any other areas of discretion.
6.3 Annuity Factor
For older workers, transfer values are most sensitive to the actuarial calculation
of the annuity factor. The annuity factor is the present value of an annuity of
$1 per annum beginning at the retirement age, taking into account survivorship
probabilities and any uprating of the annuity over time to account for inflation.
The relevant formula is:
8This table is computed using the formula:
h
(1+)
1+0:04
iR
where is the actuary-assumed inflation
rate andR is the number of years to retirement.
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Age Life Expectancy Annuity Factors
(years) ~ = 8% ~ = 4:35% ~ = 3:85%
Men
58 21.3 9.23 12.81 13.48
59 20.5 9.06 12.49 13.13
60 19.7 8.89 12.17 12.79
61 19.0 8.72 11.86 12.44
62 18.2 8.55 11.55 12.10
63 17.5 8.37 11.23 11.75
64 16.8 8.19 10.91 11.40
65 16.1 8.00 10.59 11.05
Women
58 26.4 10.25 14.78 15.66
59 25.5 10.11 14.48 15.33
60 24.6 9.97 14.18 14.99
61 23.7 9.82 13.87 14.64
62 22.9 9.67 13.55 14.29
63 22.0 9.51 13.23 13.93
64 21.2 9.34 12.91 13.57
65 20.3 9.16 12.57 13.20
~r = 8% ~r = 8% ~r = 8%
~ = 0% ~ = 3:5% ~ = 4%
Table 6.5: Life expectancy and annuity factors at retirement age based on PA90.
A(tN) =
1X
s=1

1 + ~
1 + ~r
s
sptN
=
1X
s=1

1
1 + ~
s
sptN (6.2)
where:
sptN – survivorship probability from agetN to tN + s.
~ – the annual uprating factor.
~r – the nominal discount rate.
~ – the real discount rate (defined as1+~r
1+~
  1)
The MFR rules require that survivorship probabilities are based on the mortal-
ity tables PA90 downrated two years (to account for the improvements in mortality
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since these tables were constructed). The PA(90) tables are suitable for the type
of people taking out private pension annuities at retirement age in the sense that
such people are likely to enjoy greater longevity than the population as a whole
(for which another set of mortality tables such as the English Life Tables No. 14
might be more appropriate).
Table (6.5) lists the annuity factors for men and women at different retirement
ages; they also show the life expectancies of these individuals (these were found
using Eq. (6.2) with~ = 0). The calculations were made using the Standard Ta-
bles Programme (Continuous Mortality Investigation Bureau 1994). The nominal
discount rate~r used was8% which is the same as the MFR basis for retired work-
ers (namely, the yield on gilts). Three different assumptions concerning uprating
were made, namely0%, 3:5% and4:0%, to assess the sensitivity of the annuity
factor. For a65 year old man, the effect of a0:5% absolute change in the inflation
assumption is a5% change in the value of the annuity factor, demonstrating the
sensitivity of transfer values to assumptions underlying the annuity factor.
6.4 Real Wage Growth Rates
In addition, while the outgoing transfer is not required to take into account real
wage growth (since it uses the CUM), the incoming transfer will normally be
valued using the projected unit method which accounts for future wage growth.
GN11 contains a clause (3.6) which says that:
In calculating benefits in respect of transfer values received by a re-
tirement benefit scheme the actuary should use methods and assump-
tions which are reasonable and consistent with the methods and as-
sumptions (including any allowance for future discretionary bene-
fits) normally used for outgoing cash equivalents from that scheme....
Appropriate adjustment would be required, in respect of incoming
transfers, to take account of expected salary increases in cases where
‘added years’ are to be credited...
Consider a worker with10 years of service in a scheme with a salary of
$20; 000 who is 30 years from retirement and who accepts a job at another firm
with exactly the same wage. Then, if the actuary of the new scheme projects wage
growth at the MFR norm of2% and the old and new schemes are similar in all
other respects, the worker will receive only5:52 years of service credit.9 Since
9If inflation is less than5% (the maximum indexation under LPI), the relative loss to the worker
is (1 + g) R whereg is the (compound) growth rate assumption for wages used by the actuary
andR is the number of years to retirement (c.f., Eq.(4.3) above).
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Figure 6.1: Average weekly real manufacturing wage in the UK versus MFR norm
(Source:OECD Main Economic Indicators, real wage,1990 = 100).
this wage growth rate is compounded, the loss for younger workers is the most se-
vere but a worker5 years from retirement will still lose nearly10% of accumulated
service credits using the MFR assumptions. We have seen above in Table (3.2) the
size of these penalties and that they are sensitive to wage growth. When a worker
opts for a frozen, deferred pension, s/he loses subsequent real wage growth. In
taking a transfer value to a new scheme, a worker loses future wage growthin
excess ofthe rate assumed by the actuary. Thus, the actuarial assumptions on real
wage growth used in inward transfers are crucial in assessing portability loss.
Adopting the MFR assumption of a constant real wage growth ignores the
following variations:
 Real wage growth differs between men and women.Real wages in man-
ufacturing have grown at approximately2% as shown in Fig. (6.1). The
median real wage growth for men for 1984-1996 was1:7% per year and
the median real wage growth rate for women for 1984-1996 was2:6%. The
mean real wage growth for men for 1984-1996 was2:07%, whereas for
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women it was2:90%.10
 Real wage growth varies across industries and occupations.The median
manual male worker only had average real wage growth of1:1% between
1984 and 1996, whereas the average non-manual male worker had double
this growth rate. Even among manual workers, there is an industry-specific
dispersion in growth rates. For example, the average male manual worker in
paper and tobacco, printing and publishing (1980 SIC 47) exhibited average
nominal wage growth of5:5% p.a. whereas in construction (1980 SIC 50),
it was approximately6:5% p.a.
 Typical wage profiles do not have constant growth rates but rather are
likely to have higher real wage growth at the beginning of a career and
lower or even negative real wage growth near retirement.Furthermore,
wage profiles differ between men and women. According to the New Earn-
ings Survey, the average gross weekly pay of those aged 50-59 in 1996 was
about6% lower than that of those aged 40-49, whereas the gross weekly
pay of those aged 30 to 39 was22% higher than that of those aged 25 to
29. These figures, taken at a single point of time, do not take into account
the fact that the worker who is in the age range 25 to 29 will very likely
be earning even more than his colleagues who are currently aged 30 to 39
when he reaches that age range because of real wage growth. These issues
are reflected in the ‘typical’ wage profiles we used in our analyses.
6.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have reviewed the discretion available to actuaries in making
their calculations of cash equivalents. We have computed elasticities of actuar-
ial discretion which measure the ratio of the percentage change in the computed
pension to the percentage change in the actuarial assumption. We have evaluated
these elasticities at the MFR norms and have found that small changes in actu-
arial assumptions can have relatively large effects on the value of the pension in
payment. We then proceeded to examine the following actuarial discretionary pa-
rameters in detail: discount rates, inflation rates, annuity factors, and wage growth
rates. With the exception of the annuity factor, the impact of changes in different
assumptions depends on the time to retirement. We also identified a number of
other areas (such as the valuation of discretionary benefits) over which the actuary
10The source for these calculations is the New Earnings Survey (1984 data from(Department of
Employment 1985), 1994 data from (Office of National Statistics 1994). The price index used was
the average for the year.
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also has discretion but on which is not possible for us to comment in the absence
of published documentation as to standard practice. We have also reviewed, us-
ing the example of wage growth rates, how individual circumstances can vary
tremendously and why either actuarial discretion or more complex rules (beyond
the MFR assumptions) might be needed to determine transfer values.
Chapter 7
International Comparisons
The UK is not the only country where the issue of pension portability has been the
subject of public debate. Pension portability losses also arise in other countries
with well-developed private sector pension schemes. In this chapter, we review
the nature of portability losses that can arise in private-sector schemes in the U.S.,
Canada, the Netherlands and Japan ((Turner 1993), chs 7 and 12) and ((Turner
and Watanabe 1995), ch 7)).
In the U.S., most defined benefit pension schemes are noncontributory and
workers leaving jobs lose all their pension rights if their pension has not vested by
the time they leave. Before the 1974 Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA), many workers had to stay until retirement to vest, while most schemes
granted vesting when the sum of age and years of service exceeded 40. Accrued
benefits could be lost if there was a break in service, if workers were guilty of
misconduct, or if they moved to a rival company. ERISA standardized vesting
conditions and prohibited divesting once vesting had been granted. The 1986
Tax Reform Act shortened the vesting period specified in ERISA. Two methods
of vesting are permitted. With ’cliff vesting’, an employee jumps from zero to
100% vesting after 5 years’ service. With ’graded vesting’, an employee jumps
from zero to 20% vesting after 3 years, and thereafter the degree of vesting in-
creases by 20% per year until the employee is fully vested after 7 years. However,
the deferred vested benefits of early leavers are not protected against inflation in
most defined benefit schemes in the U.S. Vesting is immediate in respect of an
employee’s own contributions to a defined benefit scheme or to a defined contri-
bution scheme operated on behalf of an individual employee by an employer, such
as a 401(k) plan. Nearly 90% of employer-provided pension schemes in the U.S.,
covering more than 50% of employees who are members of pension schemes, are
now of the defined contribution type.
Service is portable between schemes in the U.S. if they have a reciprocity
agreement. This is common in multi-employer plans which cover employees in
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an industry or craft within a particular geographical region (e.g., trucking and
coal mining). It is also fairly common amongst related employers in a ’controlled
group’ (a group of firms with more than 80% common ownership). It is much less
common in single-employer plans unless they happen to be in certain industries
such as finance, insurance, or real estate. There are two types of reciprocity: the
’money follows the worker’ agreement and the ’pro rata’ agreement. With the first
type, the employee has a ’home’ plan and any service accrued by the employee
while working temporarily for another employer is credited to the home plan ac-
cording to the rules of that plan. With the second type, the total pension is based
on the combined service in all schemes, with each scheme providing a propor-
tion of the total pension on a pro rata basis. An extension of the multi-employer
arrangement is the portability network or clearing house which runs the pension
schemes of all the firms in a single industry and allows full portability of service
between schemes. The largest network is TIAA-CREF, the Teachers Insurance
and Annuity Association and the College Retirement Equity Fund. The networks
are organized either as trusts or as life assurance companies. Where the worker
has a defined contribution scheme, the worker’s vested account is transferred be-
tween employers. Where the worker has a defined benefit plan, service in one plan
counts towards vesting in the next plan.
It is possible in the U.S. for workers to receive lump sum cash distributions
representing the present value of their accrued rights when they leave an em-
ployer’s scheme. This is fairly common when the lump sum is small, since
schemes wish to avoid the costs of administering the small accounts of former
members. However, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 imposes a 10% tax if the lump
sum is not transferred (or ’rollovered’) to an Independent Retirement Account
(IRA) or to another employer-sponsored plan within 60 days, thereby providing
a weak incentive not to take pre-retirement distributions. However, rollovers into
employer-sponsored plans are limited, because new employers will generally not
accept rollovers; even with 401(k) plans, only 50% of participants are in plans that
accepted rollovers from previous employers.
The second Clinton administration plans to increase pension portability and
security in a new Retirement Savings and Security Act. Workers will be able to
join a pension scheme as soon as they begin working for a new employer (and this
includes federal employees who join the Thrift Savings Plan), rather than having
to wait for up to a year or more as they do now. They will also have the right to roll
over their accrued benefits into a new employer’s scheme. The Act will increase
the numbers eligible to open tax-deductible IRAs (such as middle-income work-
ers), make IRAs available for job-related purposes such as training, first home
purchases, major medical expenses and support during extended spells of unem-
ployment (without incurring the 10% early withdrawal penalty tax), and allow
small businesses to start new, simplified 401(k)-type plans (called National Em-
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ployee Savings Trusts (NESTs)) that are fully portable. The Act will also increase
the security of pension assets, especially in 401(k) plans where it is currently pos-
sible for employers to ’borrow’ the contributions made by employees before they
are transferred to plan trustees, and there is also currently no requirement for plan
administrators or auditors to report a problem that they have identified until the
annual report is filed. Under the Act, employers will have to restore any delin-
quent contributions, there will be broader audits, and administrators and auditors
will be required to report any suspected fraud to the Department of Labor imme-
diately. The Act will also uprate the maximum level of benefits in multi-employer
plans guaranteed by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation for inflation since
1980, the year that the maximum level was last reset. Finally, the Act will protect
the pensions of state and local government employees by placing their pension
assets in trust (so removing such employees from the risk faced by bankruptcy
of the employer as happened in Orange County in California). These measures
should go some way towards enhancing the pension rights of U.S. workers, and
also of bringing their position somewhat closer that enjoyed by workers in the
U.K., following the passage of the 1995 Pensions Act there.
Defined contribution schemes are much less common in the Canada, Nether-
lands, and Japan than they are in the U.S. Almost all the schemes in the Nether-
lands and Japan are defined benefit (indeed personal pension schemes are not cur-
rently available in Japan); many of the schemes in Canada are also defined benefit
and while there are individual defined contribution schemes (known as Registered
Retirement Savings Plans (RRSPs) and similar to IRAs), there are much fewer of
these than in the U.S. The vesting period is much shorter in these three countries
than in the U.S.: 2 years in Canada, one year in the Netherlands, and, in practice,
there is fairly rapid vesting in Japan (typically less than 2 years), although there
are no formal rules covering vesting.
The deferred vested benefits of early leavers in the Netherlands are generally
indexed to inflation, although this is not a mandatory requirement. Similarly, it is
not mandatory to uprate pensions in payment, although it is common practice, and
early leavers and long stayers must be treated in the same manner. In Canada, the
indexation of deferred vested benefits is as uncommon as it is in the U.S. In Japan,
Tax-Qualified Pension Plans do not provide for the indexation of deferred vested
benefits: instead, early leavers receive their accrued benefits as a cash lump sum
when they leave such schemes.
Portability clearing houses operate in the Netherlands and Japan. Most large
pension schemes in Holland participate in one of five portability clearing houses,
known as ’transfer circuits’. These deal with the transfer of deferred vested ben-
efits. They were established in 1987 following government threats to introduce
legislation to improve portability if a suitable private-sector alternative was not
forthcoming. Early leavers can keep their vested rights in the scheme they are
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leaving, or transfer them to their new employer’s scheme using a clearing house.
This transfer procedure is simplified by the fact that most defined benefit schemes
in Holland have identical accrual rates based on average final salary and years of
service and that all schemes must use a common discount rate for valuing liabil-
ities of 4%. One important consequence of the portability clearing house system
as operated in Holland is that full service (ie the full number of added years) is
credited on transfer. This means that early leavers do not lose out from career
progression when they change jobs, as they do in the UK, where typically less
than full service is credited in the new employer’s scheme. It should be noted,
however, that the Dutch system of transfer circuits works largely because of the
high degree of uniformity in benefit structures across different schemes.
Japan also has a clearing house for schemes contracted-out under the Employ-
ees’ Pension Fund. The clearing house is operated by the Pension Fund Associ-
ation (PFA), to which all contracted-out pension schemes belong. The accrued
benefits of early leavers with less than 10 years’ service are automatically trans-
ferred to the PFA (unless the early leaver requests a cash lump sum distribution),
while those of early leavers with between 10 and 15 years’ service can also be
transferred to the PFA if the leaving scheme requests it. The sum transferred is
the present value of benefits based on nominal career average earnings up to the
point of leaving, using a discount rate of 5.5%. Once a transfer has been made, the
employer faces no further obligation. When a Japanese worker eventually retires,
the pension is paid in a lump sum.
There are no portability clearing houses in Canada and statutorily-vested pen-
sion benefits cannot be converted into a preretirement cash distribution. Deferred
benefits in this case can only be paid at retirement in the form of a pension an-
nuity. However, scheme-vested benefits (in the case where a scheme vests more
rapidly than under the statutory minimum) can be refunded if scheme rules permit,
as can employee contributions which do not give rise to a deferred pension when
an employee leaves. Transfers can, however, be made to an RRSP, but assets in
an RRSP cannot be withdrawn before retirement. Transfers can also be used to
purchase a deferred annuity from a life assurance company. In theory, transfers
can also be made to a new employer’s scheme, but in practice few employers will
accept such transfers.
7.1 Summary
Holland appears to have done the most to reduce the portability losses incurred
by early leavers, and the U.S. the least. The U.K., Canada and Japan come some-
where in the middle. The U.K. has twice the vesting period of Holland, only
limited price indexation of the deferred pension and the pension in payment com-
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pared with full indexation in Holland, and a transfer system (except for those in
the public sector Transfer Club) that in practice gives less than full service credits
in a new employer’s scheme in contrast with the full service credits that oper-
ate within the Dutch clearing house system. However, the UK has much earlier
vesting than the U.S. and Canada, a much more flexible transfer system than the
U.S., and at least partial indexation of deferred benefits compared with none at
all for the U.S., Canada and Japan. In addition, the UK (along with Holland and
Canada) prohibit pre-retirement distributions of accrued pension benefits. Such
distributions are common in the U.S. and Japan, and because they are in many
cases not reinvested in a pension scheme, this can lead to a substantial reduction
in the retirement incomes of early leavers in these countries. It should not be a
surprise to discover that most U.S. workers currently receive the majority of their
retirement income in the form of social security payments rather than in the form
of private sector pensions.
Chapter 8
Policy Options
In this study, we have reviewed the costs that workers face in changing jobs due
to the incomplete portability of their pensions and the general backloading of pay.
Although there have been dramatic improvements in portability in the UK over
the past twenty years, the Pensions Act of 1995 and its implementation will have
the effect that, for the average worker, cash equivalents are reduced because of:
 The use of higher discount rates. Equity yields can now be used instead of
bond yields, with some corrections for older workers. For a typical worker
such as Mr. Low in Chapter 5 who lost his job at age 45, this had the effect
of reducing his transfer value in 1995 prices from$47; 985 to$41; 902 or
by over10%. These are nontrivial losses resulting from a piece of legislation
that was intended toimprovethe portability of pensions.1
 The use of lower revaluation factors.The Guaranteed Minimum Pension
has disappeared with the Pensions Act of 1995. The GMP part of a pension
was uprated with the growth in national average earnings. The GMP has
been replaced with the Minimum Cash Equivalent which is subject to only
limited price indexation. The result is that transfer values are smaller, espe-
cially for low wage workers. Assuming Mr. Low’s pension is all GMP (not
unreasonable since Mr. Low is a low earner), the transfer value he receives
when he leaves his job at age45 would only be67:3% of what he received
before the Pensions Act of 1995. The net effect is that his transfer value is
reduced from$62; 265 to$41; 902.
Given that there were substantial portability lossesb forethe Pensions Act of
1995, it is useful to consider what could have been done to improve portability.
1This loss is before taking into account Market Value Adjustments which currently have the
effect of raising transfer values (see Appendix D).
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Given existing expectations about final salary pensions and also the huge size of
pension fund assets, it might not be realistic to introduce radical change instanta-
neously. In addition, the changes in the calculation of transfer values following
the 1995 Pensions Act have clear rationales. Given the difficulty of estimating
future real wage growth at the industry level and the risks to schemes of liabilities
linked to real wages growth, it was quite sensible to eliminate real wage uprating.
In addition, given that pension funds invest heavily in equities, it was sensible to
change the discount rate to reflect more accurately the weighted returns on the
composition of pension fund assets.
Nevertheless, the net effect of these changes is to reduce the transfer values
workers receive. In Chapter 7 above, we considered how other countries deal with
portability. Some, such as Chile and Australia, have opted for portable defined
contribution schemes. These schemes involve mandatory worker contributions to
one of a set of managed funds. There are no portability losses or losses due to
backloaded pay, but workers bear all asset market risk. This structure has also
been proposed for the U.K. in (Blake 1992).
In this chapter, we propose a policy that isargetedspecifically at early leavers.
It has the additional advantage of being adjustable over time so that it approaches
a portable defined contribution scheme. Consider a portable defined contribution
scheme. This provides early leavers with a transfer value which is equal to to-
tal accumulated contributions. Although with defined benefit schemes, there is
no hypothecated pot of money that is attached to an individual, the firm and em-
ployee have both made contributions which have generated an investment return.
It therefore seems reasonable to provide workers with a transfer value that de-
pends onboth the investment performance of the fund’s assets and the accrued
pension benefit calculated by standard actuarial methods. This policy proposal
will involve early leavers receiving higher transfer values but also bearing more
asset market risk on the additional transfer values they receive.
Specifically, our policy proposal is that the transfer value should change from
Eq. (4.2) to:
PTV (tk 1; t) = (t)PCUM(tk 1; t) + (1  (t))P
0
DC(tk 1; t) (8.1)
where:
(t) – a set of age-dependent weights between0 a d1.
PCUM – the transfer value formula based on current practice (c.f.,Eq. (4.2)).,
t – the current age of the scheme member,
tk 1 – the age of entry into the scheme,
and:
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P 0DC(tk 1; t) =
tX
s=tk 1
csW (s)(1 + rs;t)
t s (8.2)
is a modified version of Eq. (4.7) which reflects actual contribution ratescs and
realized fund returnsrs;t. Incoming transfer values would be valued in exactly the
same manner except that Eq. (4.7) would be used instead ofPCUM in calculating
service credits.
When(t) = 1 for all agest, Eq. (8.1) gives the transfer value an early
leaver is currently entitled to today. When(t) = 0 for all agest, Eq. (8.1) gives
the transfer value a worker would receive in a fully portable defined contribution
scheme. Our proposal involves selecting a value of between0 and1 and, in
particular, choosing closer to1 for young workers and closer to0 for older
workers. Our policy proposal would, therefore, not affect the structure and level
of retirement benefits of workers who work their entire career in the same job. It
would also be simple to implement and could potentially even be implemented as
an actuarial Guidance Note.2
On the other hand, this proposal would protect workers and increase job mo-
bility in the U.K. and it would not impose additional risks on firms because Eq.
(8.2) depends only on realized values instead of future expectations about vari-
ables such as wage growth rates about which there is much uncertainty. Workers
would receive additional transfer values because, as we have seen, the contribu-
tion rates implicit in Eq. (4.1) are backloaded, so that the marginal increase in
pension benefit when a worker is young is smaller than the actual contributions
made.
One possibility is to set:
(t) =
t  t0
tN   t0
(8.3)
wheret0 is the age of entry into the labour force andtN is the retirement age.
Thus, just before retirement, the transfer value is close to the level as currently
calculated. However, when young, the transfer value received is close to the value
of invested contributions.
To illustrate how our proposal would work, we consider again the typical MFR
worker who satisfies all the actuarial assumptions to be used in computing the
Minimum Funding Requirement. In other words, we assume that all wage and
2Eq. (8.2) is simple enough to calculate but, in practice, actuaries might provide tables which
calculate Eq. (8.2) approximately in terms of starting and final salary, average contribution rates,
realized asset returns, and years of service.
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Figure 8.1: Proposed transfer value relative to current transfer value calculated
assuming MFR assumptions are realized
market interest assumptions are realized and equal to MFR norms. In Fig. (8.1)
we plot the ratio of the proposed transfer value to the transfer values as currently
computed by actuaries using MFR norms. The worker who leaves at age45 will
get a transfer value which is approximately50% higher than today. The actual
transfer values will, of course, differ from those based on MFR norms that may
not be realized. For Mr. Low, the transfer value of$41; 902 (1995 prices) he
receives after losing his job at age45 becomes under our proposal$57; 783. That
is more than the$47; 985 he would have received before the implementation of
the 1995 Pensions Act allowed the use of equity yields in discounting, but still less
than the$62; 265 which the actuary attached to his accrued pension rights before
he lost his job and much less than the$73; 665 value of (accumulated) employer
and employee contributions.
Although the transfer value ratios in Fig. (8.1) may appear high, the sums that
would be paid out are neverthelesssmallerthan the accrued contributions because
of the backloaded accrual structure of defined benefit schemes. In Fig. (8.2), we
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Figure 8.2: Proposed transfer value relative to accrued contributions with MFR
assumptions realized
plot the ratio of the transfer value to the accumulated contributions. The middle-
aged worker aged 45 is relatively the worst off (at least if the weighting system
in Eq. (8.3) is used), but he is still receiving a much higher transfer value under
our proposal. There would still be portability losses to workers who change jobs,
but the degree of loss could be adjusted as a matter of policy by changing the
age-dependent weights(t).
8.1 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented a policy proposal that would not require major
changes in legislation but would still improve dramatically the treatment of early
leavers. It involves early leavers receiving some of their accrued contributions
back when they leave a scheme in addition to a proportion of the accrued service
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credits calculated according to current actuarial methods. This proposal could
either be a stopgap measure or one component of the transition to a fully portable
defined contribution scheme.
If a policy proposal similar to this is not adopted, then the only apparent ways
of improving portability within the system of defined benefit schemes as operated
in the UK are: (1) to give full service credits on transfer, and (2) to uprate deferred
pensions in line with the growth rate of earnings rather than prices.
Chapter 9
Conclusions
Only a small proportion of UK workers in defined benefit occupational pension
schemes can expect to receive a full service pension when they retire. The reason
for this is that the vast majority of scheme members change jobs at least once dur-
ing their careers and on average more than five times, and they will suffer porta-
bility losses each time they switch to a different pension scheme. They will be
offered a cash equivalent of their accrued pension benefits, and this must be used
to buy service credits (or some other entitlement) in their new employer’s scheme,
to keep a deferred pension in their leaving scheme, or to buy into a personal pen-
sion scheme. On the basis of the actuarial methods used to determine both the size
of the cash equivalent from the leaving scheme or the number of added years in
the new scheme, early leavers experience various types of penalties which reduce
their retirement income.
In this study, we have investigated these penalties in detail, and in particular,
have identified two principal types of losses:
 Cash equivalent lossesarise because the early leaver’s salary is revalued to
retirement age at a less favourable rate than used to determine the projected
final salary. In computing transfer values, actuaries use the ‘current unit
method with revaluation’ to revalue early leaver salaries, while they use the
‘projected unit method’ to project final salaries. These different methods
lead to fewer ‘added years’ credited in a new scheme than are earned in the
leaving scheme. The cash equivalent loss is largest inabsoluteterms for
workers who leave schemes in middle age, but isrelatively the highest for
the youngest early leavers.
 Backloading lossesdue to the implicit backloading of contributions in de-
fined benefit schemes cause additional losses to those who switch to schemes
(such as money purchase or defined contribution schemes) which do not
backload contributions. This loss particularly affects older workers since
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employers face higher marginal pensions costs for such workers. The back-
loading loss becomes increasingly relevant with the growing importance of
money puchase schemes in the U.K.
In addition to the losses mentioned above, we have also analyzedactuarial
discretion as a key source of potential variability in determining cash equivalents.
In principle, actuarial variations can lead to quantitatively larger penalties than the
losses mentioned above.
Non-portable defined benefit pensions were originally designed as a reward
for long service and employee loyalty. The use of a pension scheme in an at-
tempt to influence and regulate worker behaviour over their working lifetimes
was always going to be a fairly blunt instrument. This instrument has been made
even blunter as lifetime service with the same employer is no longer a common
feature of employment relationships. In addition, economic justifications for non-
portable pensions have become weaker with the emergence of alternative devices
for rewarding employee loyalty.
To increase pension portability within the context of the existing framework
of defined benefit schemes, we have developed a policy proposal which would
not require major changes in legislation but would still improve dramatically the
treatment of early leavers. It involves workers receiving some of their accrued
contributions back when they leave a scheme as well as a fraction of their accrued
service credits calculated according to current methods.
This proposal does not eliminate the portability losses of early leavers, it only
reduces them. Full portability requires either the complete transferability of ser-
vice credits or the complete indexing of deferred pensions to real wage growth. In
the absence of these changes to current practices, full portability in the context of
private sector schemes can only be achieved using defined contribution schemes.
The perceived drawback to such schemes is that the employee now bears all the
asset market risk, but it has been shown elsewhere (Blake 1996) that so long as
adequate contributions are made to such schemes over a sufficiently long period,
this risk is minimized and a pension close to that available from the best available
defined benefit scheme can be replicated with appropriate financial instruments.
Appendices
Appendix A: MFR Norms
This appendix contains the MFR norms exactly as the appear in the appendix:
‘Current Factors for Use in MFR Valuation’ in Guidance Note 27 of the Faculty
and Institute of Actuaries ((Institute and Faculty of Actuaries 1996), B27.11-12)
A. The current gilt yields to be used for valuing pensioner liabilities should
be the gross redemption yield on the FT-Actuaries Fixed Interest 15 year Medium
Coupon Index or the FT-Actuaries Index-linked Over 5 years (5 % inflation) In-
dex, as appropriate. In the case of LPI pension increases, either fixed-interest gilts
with 5% pension increases or indexed-linked gilts assuming pension increases
0:5% less than inflation should be used, whichever gives the lower value of lia-
bilities. Similar principles should be applied for other pensions which are index-
linked but subject to a cap other than5%.
B.1. The long-term financial assumptions to be used are as follows:
Rate of inflation – 4 % per annum
Effective rate of return on gilts – 8 % per annum
Effective rate of return on equities - pre MFR pension age – 9 % per annum
Effective rate of return on equities - post MFR pension age – 10 % per annum
Rate of increase of GMP under Limited Revaluation – 5 % per annum
Rate of statutory revaluation for deferred benefits – 4 % per annum
Rate of LPI increase in payment – 3.5 % per annum
Rate of increase in post 1988 GMPs – 2.75 % per annum
Rate of increase in S148 Orders – 2 % per annum
The real rate of return on index-linked stocks isi where(1 + i) = 1:08
1:04
.
B.2. An additional assumption needed for the projection calculations for the
Schedule of Contributions.
Real rate of salary growth – 2 % per annum.
C. Market Value Adjustments (MVAs)
C.1. The MVA in relation to equities should be the ratio of4:25% to the gross
dividend yield on the FT-SE Actuaries All-Share Index.
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C.2. The MVA in respect to gilts should be the value at the annualised yield
on the FT-Actuaries Fixed Interest 15 year Medium Coupon Index or the FT-
Actuaries Index-linked Over 5 years (5% inflation) Index, as appropriate, of a
15 year stock with coupon equal to the relevant long-term assumption, payable
annually in arrears.
C.3. For liabilities which when in payment might be valued using either the
yield on a fixed-interest gilt basis or that on an index-linked gilt basis, the MVA
should be that which produces the lower liability.
C.4 If the liability includes a retirement lump sum payment, for the lump sum
liability the market value adjustment on the proportion (g) of that part of the lia-
bility deemed invested in gilts (e.g. 0.3. if seven years from MFR pension age)
should be:
f1  (1  g)  (1  gilt MVA )g
D. Demographic assumptions
D.1. Mortality (before and after retirement) – PA90 rated down two years.
D.2. In the case of schemes which have a pensioner liability (assessed on the
gilt basis) of at least$100 million, the mortality basis to be adopted should be
that which the actuary considers appropriate for that scheme in respect of current
pensioners and other members who have reached MFR pension age. In the case of
all other schemes, and for non-pensioners below MFR pension age, the standard
mortality table specified above should be adopted.
D. 3. Proportions married. For pensioners, the assumption should be consis-
tent with80% (men) or70% (women) at age 60. For non-pensioners, the assump-
tion should be, at the assumed date of retirement or earlier death,80% (men) or
70% (women).
D. 4. Age difference between husband and wife – 3 years.
E. Expenses.
E. 1. The allowance to be made for expenses connected with closure of the
scheme, continuation as a closed scheme and eventual wind-up should be4% of
the value of the accrued liabilities for the first$50 million of such liabilities,3%
of the value of the accrued liabilities for the next$50 million of such liabilities
and2% of the remainder of the value of accrued liabilities.
Appendix B: Calculation of Cash Equivalents
In this appendix, we present a general formula for calculating the cash equivalent
which includes survivorship probabilities to the retirement age, discretionary ben-
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efits, death-in-service as well as spouse’s benefits. With these additional factors,
Eq. (4.2) for valuation of cash equivalents becomes:
PCUM(tk 1; t) = tN tptPCUM(tk 1; t)

1 + S(t; tN)
AS(tN )
A(tN)

+DS(t; tN)
(9.1)
with:
PCUM(tk 1; t) = a(t  tk 1)W (t) (1 + )
tN tA(tN)D(t; tN) (9.2)
spt – survivorship probability from aget to t+ s.
a – the accrual rate (typically1
60
),
tk 1 – the age at entry into the scheme,
t – the current age of the scheme member,
tN – the normal retirement age of the scheme member,
W (t) – the pensionable salary at aget,
 – revaluation rate for the deferred pension (the MFR norm is4% p.a.),
r – the discount rate (MFR norm8%  10%),
D(t; tN) – the discount factor (

1
1+r
tN t if the discount rater is constant),
A(tN) – the annuity factor (the present value of a pension annuity of$1 per
annum) at retirement agetN (typically lies between12  16),
S(t; tN) – the spouse’s pension as a fraction of the total pension multiplied by
the probability married. The MFR norms assume that80% of men and70% of
women are married when they reach the MFR pension age. The MFR reference
scheme in the Pensions Act of 1995 does not include a spouse’s pension but does
include a widow’s/widower’s pension of half the member’s pension. As an ex-
ample, if the 80% rate is applied to all spouses,S(t; tN) = 0:80  0:50 = 0:40.
GN11 allows the actuary to use the actual marital status of the member (GN11,
4.5).
AS(tN) – the annuity factor for the spouse. The MFR norms state thatA(tN)
andAS(tN) are to be calculated according to PA(90) downrated two years. How-
ever, some variation is permitted such as assuming thatA(tN) = AS(tN ). The
MFR norm specifies an age difference between husband and wife of three years.
The spouse’s actual age may be used for Minimum Cash Equivalent purposes only
where the pension would be payable to the current spouse (GN11, 4.5). The MFR
norms permit large schemes (with liabilities in excess of$100 million) to use
other mortality bases (e.g., English Life Tables, etc.).
DS(t; tN) – value of discretionary benefits, death-in-service, and disability
benefits. For death-in-service benefits, the MFR reference scheme in the Pensions
Pensions Portability in the U.K. 105
Act of 1995 (sec. 136(12B)) provides the spouse with a pension of50% of the
pension due to the member if s/he had been a deferred pensioner at the retirement
age of the spouse. GN11 directs that discretionary benefits be taken into account
in computing cash equivalents unless the trustees direct otherwise.
A market value adjustment (MVA; c.f., Appendix D) is applied to the value of
Eq. (9.1) to arrive at the cash equivalentPCE:
PCE(t) = PCUM(tk 1; t)MVAt (9.3)
Appendix C: Calculation of Added Years of Service
In this appendix, we present the general formula for calculating added years of
service to account for such factors as survivorship probabilities to retirement age,
discretionary benefits, death-in-service and spouses’ benefits. With these factors,
Eq. (4.1) for the value of pension benefits:
PPUM(tk 1; t) = tN tptPPUM(tk 1; t)

1 + S(t; tN)
AS(tN)
A(tN )

+ ~DS(t; tN)
(9.4)
where:
PPUM(tk 1; t) = a (t  tk 1)W (t)R(t; tN)A(tN)D(t; tN) (9.5)
= a (t  tk 1)W (t) [(1 + g)(1 + )]
tN tA(tN )D(t; tN)
where:
a – the accrual rate (typically1
60
but the MFR reference scheme has1
80
),
tk 1 – the age at entry into the scheme,
t – the current age of the scheme member,
tN – the normal retirement age of the scheme member,
W (t) – the pensionable salary at aget,
R(t; tN) = [(1 + g)(1 + )]
tN t – the revaluation factor describing how ben-
efits are uprated between agest andtN ,
g – the growth rate of real wages (MFR norm2%),
 – the inflation rate (MFR norm4%),
r – the discount rate (MFR norm8%  10%),
D(t; tN) – the discount factor (

1
1+r
tN t if the discount rater is constant),
A(tN) – the annuity factor (the present value of a pension annuity of$1 per
annum) at retirement agetN (typically lies between12  16),
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S(t; tN) – the spouse’s pension as a fraction of the total pension multiplied by
the probability married. The MFR norms assume that80% of men and70% of
women are married when they reach the MFR pension age. The MFR reference
scheme in the Pensions Act of 1995 does not include a spouse’s pension but does
include a widow’s/widower’s pension of half the member’s pension. As an exam-
ple, if the80% rate is applied to all spouses,S(t; tN ) = 0:800:50 = 0:40. GN11
allows the actuary to use the actual marital status of the member (GN11, 4.5).
AS(tN) – the annuity factor for the spouse. The MFR norms state thatA(tN)
andAS(tN) are to be calculated according to PA(90) downrated two years. How-
ever, some variation is permitted such as assuming thatA(tN) = AS(tN ). The
MFR norm specifies an age difference between husband and wife of three years.
The spouse’s actual age may be used for Minimum Cash Equivalent purposes only
where the pension would be payable to the current spouse (GN11, 4.5). The MFR
norms permit large schemes (with liabilities in excess of$100 million) to use
other mortality bases (e.g., English Life Tables, etc.).
~DS(t; tN ) – value of discretionary benefits, death-in-service, and disability
benefits. For death-in-service benefits, the MFR reference scheme in the Pensions
Act of 1995 (sec. 136(12B)) provides the spouse with a pension of50% of the
pension due to the member if s/he had been a deferred pensioner at the retirement
age of the spouse. GN11 directs that discretionary benefits be taken into account
in computing cash equivalents unless the trustees direct otherwise. We use~DS
to refer to the value of discretionary, death-in-service and disability benefits in-
stead of theDS which was used in Appendix B because calculation of~DS will
incorporate earnings growth factors whereas that ofDS will not.
To calculate the number of years of service for a transferring member, we want
to solve the equation:
PCE(t) = PPUM(~tk 1; t) (9.6)
for ~tk 1 wherePCE(t) is the cash equivalent received at aget from the previous
scheme. The number of added years is thent   ~tk 1 wheret is the age when
entering the new scheme:
t  ~tk 1 =
PCE(t)  ~DS(t; tN )
tN tpt a
h
1 + S(t; tN)
AS(tN )
A(tN )
i
W (t) [(1 + g)(1 + )]
tN t A(tN)D(t; tN)
:
(9.7)
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Appendix D: Market Value Adjustments
This appendix reviews the Market Value Adjustments (MVA) that are applied to
a calculated transfer value. These provide adjustments to the transfer value to
account for current asset market conditions. For example, if bond yields are cur-
rently relatively high, a middle-aged worker will be able to buy a medium-term
indexed-linked bond relatively cheaply. If asset prices are currently above fun-
damental values as captured by the dividend yield, then the transfer value paid
should be correspondingly higher to reflect the likelihood that asset market condi-
tions will deteriorate in the future.
The MVA to be used for members more than ten years from MFR pension age
is the equity MVA. For those less than ten years before retirement, the MVA used
should be calculated by a linear combination of equity and gilt MVAs assuming
a progressive switch to a 100% gilt investment from a 100% equity investment
(GN27, 3.11).
Equity MVAs
For equities, the MVA is the ratio of4:25% to the gross dividend yield on the
FT-SE Actuaries All-Share Index on the date that the MVA is calculated: Fig.
(9.1) plots this MVA from 1976 to 1996. Fig. (9.2) plots the equity MVA for 1990
to 1996. The arithmetic mean from 1976 to 1996 was0:9147, the minimum was
0:513 and the maximum was1:49. Thus, over this period, the average effect of
the MVA was to reduce transfer values paid out. On the other hand, from1990
to 1996, the average was1:002, so that on average the MVA was neutral; the
minimum over this period was0:725 and the maximum was1:32. From1994 to
1996, the average was1:1099, so that transfer values were higher over this period.
According to GN11, the actuary has discretion over when and how often the
MVA is calculated, but the MVA cannot be recalculated less frequently than once
a month. Typically an actuary will calculate the MVA on the same day each month
and all transfers during the month will be calculated using this MVA.
Gilt MVAs
For gilts, the MVAs are the annualized yield on the FT-Actuaries Fixed Interest
15 Year Medium Coupon Index or the FT-Actuaries Index-linked Over 5 year (5
% inflation) Index. The first MVA is calculated as:
GMVA;1 = 0:08
1 
 
1
1+i
15
i
+

1
1 + i
15
(9.8)
wherei is the annualized yield on the FT-Actuaries Fixed Interest 15 Year Medium
Coupon Index; it is plotted in Fig. (9.3). The mean MVA calculated in this way
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Figure 9.1: Market value adjustment on equities, 1976-1996.
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Figure 9.2: Market value adjustment on equities, 1990-1996.
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Figure 9.3: Market value adjustment on gilts (method # 1), 1976-1996.
over the period 1976 to 1996 is0:816, from 1980 to 1996 is0:84 and from 1990
to 1996 is0:93, with a minimum of0:70 and a maximum of1:15.
The second MVA is calculated as:
GMVA;2 = 0:0385
1 
 
1
1+i
15
i
+

1
1 + i
15
(9.9)
wherei is the annualized equivalent of the real yield on the FT-Actuaries Index-
Linked Over 5 years (5 % Inflation) Index. It is plotted in Fig. (9.4). This has
a mean of1:005 from 1986 to 1996 and a mean of0:999 from 1990 to 1996.
Between 1990 and 1996 the minimum was0:904 and the maximum was1:12.
On average then, use of gilt MVAs may lower transfer values. In particular, the
impact of this is to lower the transfer values received by older members. For gilts,
actuaries have the choice of which gilt MVA to use (GMVA;1 orGMVA;2) as well
as discretion over the evaluation dates for Minimum Cash Equivalent calculations.
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Figure 9.4: Market value adjustment on gilts (method # 2), 1986-1996.
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